[PDF file]: […] Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: The CIA, NSA, and the crimes of the war on terror (Hot Books, 2018) ISBN 978-1-5107-2136-4 44 9 range of senior US intelligence and law enforcement officials whose experience had led them to conclude that the threatened attacks could and should have been stopped long before September 11 2001. […]
[PDF file]: […] Straw. Nor from Jonathan Powell, Downing Street chief of staff. Nor Alastair Campbell, Director of Communications. More importantly still, I have not discovered from either the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Secret Intelligence Service that the prime minister was misrepresenting their intelligence. This failure to challenge Mr Blair means that the Secret Intelligence Service […]
[PDF file]: […] published every year. SIS gave up all pretence to being a secret agency when it had that flashy new building on the Thames constructed for it. Former intelligence chiefs and former officers are now regularly interviewed by broadcasters. They have been dragged out part of the way into the light and have discovered that […]
[PDF file]: […] companion’s identity in 2008 when he told US viewers of CNN’s Larry King Live show how he had ‘. . . asked for a meeting with the Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which I got with another naval officer who had had many similar experiences and we told our story and […]
[…] Contingencies Unit the year before at Windscale; the ‘stay behind’ aspect was essentially a cover story. The context The mid-1970s was a turbulent period for the Anglo-American intelligence and security services. In the United States, in the wake of Watergate the CIA was under scrutiny by Congress and journalists as never before. CIA officers, […]
[…] gain access to vulnerable children.’ 7 I think the British state’s plan is to keep kicking Kincora into the long grass until all the witnesses from the intelligence world are dead. Grauniadia Off-guardian.org, the site which monitors the Guardian, has a splendid piece on the Guardian’s initial handling of the Panama 4 5 Goddard […]
[…] the course of this Harrison offers a variety of euphemisms: Mrs Thatcher ‘displayed formidable intellectual energy over a long period . . . Colleagues recognised a considerable intelligence of the specialised kind that a democratic politician needs’ (p. 208); had ‘an intelligence too firmly practical for the self-consciously intellectual to feel comfortable with it’ […]
[…] 9 Olaf’s father was apparently a Stasi officer,10 and it seems that Olaf was inspired to follow in his footsteps. As is the case with many other intelligence and security agencies, literal patronage was a preferential pathway for potential Stasi recruits. Perhaps the best-known instance of this structural nepotism is to be found in […]
[PDF file]: […] it had become clear that were elections to be held the government in Hanoi would win and the Saigon regime would collapse. Despite this certainty and the intelligence showing that there was absolutely no popular support for the elite in Saigon, the decision was made to have Ngô Dình Diem deposed in favour of […]
[PDF file]: […] enforcement became international, based on the ‘supply-side’ strategy. One of the consequences of US entry into World War I was the expansion of the federal government’s domestic intelligence (policing) apparatus. While US Army Intelligence retained much of its authority to spy on political dissidents, the increasing industrialisation catalysed by the war mobilisation created a […]
