[…] election.23 ‘Deep State coup’ theorists had been disputing the Russian hacking allegations since 2016, deploying two main lines of attack. The first was to reject the US intelligence community’s claims on the grounds they had a history of lying and they had failed to provide any evidence. The second line of attack was to […]
[PDF file]: […] now tarnished and forgotten. Occasionally there are allusions to a parallel narrative in the background. As early as page 14 the author states ‘. . . secret intelligence services, initially in America and Britain and latterly in former Iron Curtain countries, may have played a subtle but carefully-planned role in LSD’s discovery and penetration […]
[…] election.23 ‘Deep State coup’ theorists had been disputing the Russian hacking allegations since 2016, deploying two main lines of attack. The first was to reject the US intelligence community’s claims on the grounds they had a history of lying and they had failed to provide any evidence. The second line of attack was to […]
[PDF file]: […] case with press releases and presentations (including one by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council) using collections of classified documents and intelligence assessments. The problem was that Iraq did not have any WMD. UN weapons inspectors did not find any before or after the 2003 war. US and […]
[PDF file]: […] arrival of post invasion Iraqis – allowed the community, and its children in particular, to evolve quietly as more Iraqis rolled in. It was only in the intelligence sphere – which the majority of 1970s Iraqis were seeking to avoid – that it had high visibility. Some Iraqis were sought out by the SIS; […]
[…] this current issue. Much of this was interesting to me. For one thing, NFB has continued doing what Lobster used to do: surveying published material on the intelligence and security services and producing synopses of it. There is a long essay about Lockerbie; and, while I am no expert on this subject, I didn’t […]
[PDF file]: […] page 178 Glenn Sample writes: During the research and investigation phase of this book I once had the opportunity to communicate with a retired member of the intelligence community. He related to me about an event he once attended, a luncheon at the Petroleum Club in San Antonio, in 1973. ‘I couldn’t pass up […]
[PDF file]: […] by the disappearance of the boat’ – or so the FBI was told by the CIA, who in turn had received their information from the US Coastguard Intelligence Service. Since the ban on anti-Cuban covert action had been imposed by the US federal government and was being enforced through the State Department, the possibility […]
[PDF file]: […] Soviets because he had been blackmailed or because he truly believed it, he had indeed been a victim of the Great Game of espionage. None of the intelligence Curiously, Gillman and Midolo report that Worsthorne was described as a good contact by the KGB London rezident and double agent Oleg Gordievsky. Murder in Cairo […]
[PDF file]: […] this current issue. Much of this was interesting to me. For one thing, NFB has continued doing what Lobster used to do: surveying published material on the intelligence and security services and producing synopses of it. There is a long essay about Lockerbie; and, while I am no expert on this subject, I didn’t […]
