The devil has all the best songs: reflections on the life and times of Simon Dee

Lobster Issue 58 (Winter 2009/2010)

[PDF file]: […] the UK.1 Dee served in the RAF from 1953 to 1958, spending much of this time in the Middle East, culminating in his being attached to RAF Intelligence in Baghdad in 1957-1958. This was a critical period that saw the UK humiliated by the USA during the Suez crisis in late 1956. At its […]

Canada’s spy agency gone rogue: Prime Minister Harper couldn’t care less

Lobster Issue 65 (Summer 2013)

[PDF file]: Canada’s spy agency gone rogue: Prime Minister Harper couldn’t care less Roderick Russell Dr. Arthur Porter, the former chair of Canada’s spy watchdog, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), is in prison in Panama awaiting extradition to Canada where he faces multiple charges that include allegations of bribe taking, money laundering and conspiracy. Two […]

The Sleep Room: A Very British Medical Scandal by Jon Stock

Lobster Issue 90 (2025)

[PDF file]: […] who were confined to the Sleep Room. It’s unfathomable that this ‘treatment’ was allowed to continue for so long. The Sleep Room was possibly funded by the intelligence services while Ewen Cameron’s very similar Sleep Room in Montreal, which was run at the same time, most certainly was. (Stock gives a detailed account of […]

Gareth Llewellyn, CSIS and the Canadian stasi

Lobster Issue 61 (Summer 2011)

[PDF file]: Gareth Llewellyn, CSIS and the Canadian stasi W hat follows is a section of a much longer document written by a senior Canadian federal intelligence official named Gareth LLewellyn about the actions against him of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). This story is notable for his account of being ‘gang-stalked’ by CSIS. […]

Disclosure and deceit: Secrecy as the manipulation of history, not its concealment

Lobster Issue 61 (Summer 2011)

[PDF file]: […] seen as either a challenge or a prerequisite for obtaining accurate data on the history of political and economic events. Yet at the same time high government intelligence officials have said that their policy is one of ‘plausible deniability’. Official US government policy for example is never to acknowledge or deny the presence of […]

View from the bridge

Lobster Issue

[…] column in the previous Lobster, is the official US euphemism for a wide range of symptoms up to and including brain damage, referred to by all but intelligence bureaucrats as Havana Syndrome, since the first incidents happened at the US embassy there. Re-reading some of the reporting and comment on this, two things struck […]

The SIS and London-based foreign dissidents: some patterns of espionage

Lobster Issue 65 (Summer 2013)

[PDF file]: […] arrival of post invasion Iraqis – allowed the community, and its children in particular, to evolve quietly as more Iraqis rolled in. It was only in the intelligence sphere – which the majority of 1970s Iraqis were seeking to avoid – that it had high visibility. Some Iraqis were sought out by the SIS; […]

In the Thick of It: The private diaries of a minister Alan Duncan

Lobster Issue 82 (Winter 2021)

[PDF file]: […] a High Noon every Wednesday way into the silly season and beyond. Here are a few samples from the prosperous Tory loyalist, a trusted member of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee and a central figure in party life from his splendid Westminster pad for more than 30 years. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster […]

view from bridge

Lobster Issue

[…] column in the previous Lobster, is the official US euphemism for a wide range of symptoms up to and including brain damage, referred to by all but intelligence bureaucrats as Havana Syndrome, since the first incidents happened at the US embassy there. Re-reading some of the reporting and comment on this, two things struck […]

Suddenly in September?

Lobster Issue 82 (Winter 2021)

[PDF file]: […] Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: The CIA, NSA, and the crimes of the war on terror (Hot Books, 2018) ISBN 978-1-5107-2136-4 44 9 range of senior US intelligence and law enforcement officials whose experience had led them to conclude that the threatened attacks could and should have been stopped long before September 11 2001. […]

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