Lobster Issue 50 (Winter 2005/6)
[…] and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.’ In his interesting short […]
Lobster Issue 34 (Winter 1997)
[…] 31, basically. To which I would add this: Stich has collected together many of the conspiracy theories, bits of research and allegations on the U.S. political and intelligence fringe since the arrival Ronald Reagan. Some of these fragments are more convincing than others; all are interesting. A better starting place for the study of […]
Lobster Issue 30 (December 1995)
[…] Candidate a reality. For the pulse-modulated transmitters could also carry information placed on the signal: it could be modulated to send words to the brain. An expendable intelligence asset, programmed by remote hypnosis, in a post-hypnotic state, could be activated by these means, to carry out orders directed to him or her by-passing his […]
Lobster Issue 43 (Summer 2002)
[…] an unwitting part of the CIA’s MKUltra programme while a post-grad student at Oxford; and the section on the mysterious Ronald Stark, LSD entrepreneur and apparent American intelligence asset, has been elaborated. Most importantly, all the technical foul-ups which marred the first edition have gone. Vision were really crap when they first started out […]
Lobster Issue 50 (Winter 2005/6)
[…] pride: if the British are doing it, so should we. This meant that a welfare issue could be prioritised. At times, it could also mean that the intelligence services could pass a coded message, via Hansard, to, for example, a senior health professional who was a source in another country, without being seen to […]
Lobster Issue 46 (Winter 2003)
[…] in 2003, advised Blair against providing anything more than moral support for the US invasion. (9) There was no enthusiasm in the Foreign Office and the defence, intelligence and security establishments were divided.(10) Reasons for the depth of opposition included distrust of the ambitions of the George W. Bush administration, anxiety about isolation from […]
Lobster Issue 34 (Winter 1997)
[…] Murrin told Sir Peter Blaker, ‘An alternative funding source really needs to be lined up but I can only leave that to you. My own network of intelligence is now building up and I would expect results after the summer.’ 30 July Owen Oyston resigned as chairman of Red Rose Radio. September Oyston bought […]