[…] (emphasis added) when even we had them over a year before, and No. 10 Downing Street, two years before. He attributed to us a ‘conviction’ (‘that disloyal intelligence officers were behind every humiliation that Wilson suffered’) which we don’t have, and announced, as if it were a revelation, that the rumours about Marcia and […]
[…] agency in the covert alliance is simply doing what it is told. Nothing has changed in 20 years, the UN is still a prime target for US intelligence and, doubt-less, little old New Zealand is still doing its bit.'(3) Were an equivalent report on GCHQ to turn up in the UK, would any of […]
[…] Africa. The spooks must love having Labour in office, terrified to oppose anything they ask for. Hitherto secret Whitehall committee trying to deal with unauthorised exposure of intelligence material was itself exposed in the Sunday Times 21 May 2000. A page of the Guardian (tabloid section) 24 September 1999 was devoted to the Ken […]
[…] majority of MKULTRA documents in 1973 during the Watergate scramble to plug leaks and obliterate history. Helping Gottlieb destroy these documents was the then Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms. But due to one family’s own diligent search for truth, in a strange case of Justice Delayed, the truth about MKULTRA may finally come […]
[…] claimed to be confidential briefings “off the record”. The real reason which could not be told publicly for our entry to the common market was because our intelligence service had learned the Soviet Unions had plans to invade Western Europe and these would be carried out once the trade unions in Western Europe led […]
[…] him by launching the largest private sector political warfare campaign in history against him. But there are other factors. For an American politician, getting embroiled with the intelligence services or the military looks almost uniquely dangerous. There are also two more general reasons for the inertia. The Democrats are reluctant to criticise America, domestically […]
[…] had gained in popular strength, although its steady infiltration of the Iranian government and other institutions continued’.(69) As for the Tudeh’s attempting a coup, a State Department intelligence report of January 1953 noted that ‘an open Tudeh move for power……would probably unite independents and non-communists of all political leanings and would result……in energetic efforts […]
[…] As Phillips describes it, the British state and its politicians declined to do anything about this even though they were warned repeatedly throughout the 1990s by other intelligence services and other states. Phillips attributes this inactivity to a combination of political reluctance to tackle something as sensitive as immigration and concern about the impact […]
[…] These included the Miami Showband killings of July 1975. Besides this forensic evidence Holroyd had knowledge of the history of these guns. He knew, through his own intelligence work, two of those involved in the massacre and that they were ‘used’ by a RUC Special Branch officer, who he has named. That officer Holroyd […]
[…] he subsequently received. I suspect the evidence was exaggerated at a higher level in MI5 in order to ensure that Mr. Smith received a heavy sentence. The intelligence services depend on disproportionate sentences for breaches of the Official Secrets Acts to cultivate the mystique of the importance of their work. I believe Mr. Smith […]
