From Tony Hollick A Response to David Guyatt’s Operation Black Dog, in Lobster 35. All aircraft and ordnance information is from Modern Warplanes, by Doug Richardson, Salamander Books, 1982. It would have been Saddam Hussein’s most heartfelt wish, to have the US attack Iraq with nerve gas during the 1991 Gulf War. He could then […]
[…] experimental than strategic, but it was definitely offensive rather than defensive, and was part of an ongoing development program within the bowels of the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence establishments. Re: the comments in Lobster 45 p. 24, subhead ‘Monkey business?’, the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations poured millions into women’s studies, black studies, and […]
[…] in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi […]
[…] (emphasis added) when even we had them over a year before, and No. 10 Downing Street, two years before. He attributed to us a ‘conviction’ (‘that disloyal intelligence officers were behind every humiliation that Wilson suffered’) which we don’t have, and announced, as if it were a revelation, that the rumours about Marcia and […]
[…] the low-level functionary portrayed in his famous televised confession. Before becoming a journalist, Bob Woodward, of Woodward and Bernstein, had been a U.S. Navy ‘briefer’ with considerable intelligence connections, among them Alexander Haig. ‘Deep Throat’ was a device to conceal the fact that Haig was leaking to Woodward. (Or: Haig was ‘Deep Throat’.)’ One […]
[…] public relations campaign for the Kuwaiti government during the Gulf War. According to Covert Action, it is a company with strong links to the US security and intelligence community. Lloyd is the author of the anodyne history of the EEPTU, Light and Liberty (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990). These are discussed in the next […]
[…] to them; on other issues that clearly bore on the question of war, like decolonisation, Europe, and the economy; on possible extraneous influences, like business and the intelligence community; on strands of Labour opinion outside the parliamentary party – trade unions, Fabians, pressure groups, and at constituency level; and a little further back in […]
[…] largely unaware that he had been marked down as a dangerous enemy of the centralised British political system. According to the former MI5 officer David Shayler, the intelligence services file on Owen Oyston was re-examined in 1992 by the head of MI5, when it looked as if Neil Kinnock’s revived Labour party might defeat […]
[…] be said, not a shred of evidence that Hollis ever passed a single piece of information to the Soviets, nor that he had any contacts with Soviet intelligence officers or agents. But this doesn’t hinder the conspiracy theorists who will seize on any scrap of evidence to bolster the Hollis theory. As history shows, […]
[…] who will be sent to work as Resident Operators and Control Agents in foreign countries will amount to about 230.’ Considerate of them to tell the counter- intelligence services of the NATO alliance, is it not? A decade later we find the same theme in J. Bernard Hutton’s 1972 The Subverters of Liberty (p. […]
