[…] and £5 each year for 1989-92 from: Roger J Morgan, 15A Kensington Court Gardens, London W8 5QF. Roger Faligot Roger Faligot is a prolific French writer on intelligence matters best known in this country for his The Kitson Experiment (Zed/Brandon, London/Ireland 1983). He has recently published, with Remi Kauffer, Histoire mondiale de renseignement: Tome […]
[…] in an effort to dissuade them from protesting the basing of nuclear armed Cruise missiles on British soils. If the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had just played their cards cooly, Kim Besly would have remained a foot soldier in the battle against American imperialism. However one thing led to […]
[…] to them; on other issues that clearly bore on the question of war, like decolonisation, Europe, and the economy; on possible extraneous influences, like business and the intelligence community; on strands of Labour opinion outside the parliamentary party – trade unions, Fabians, pressure groups, and at constituency level; and a little further back in […]
[…] largely unaware that he had been marked down as a dangerous enemy of the centralised British political system. According to the former MI5 officer David Shayler, the intelligence services file on Owen Oyston was re-examined in 1992 by the head of MI5, when it looked as if Neil Kinnock’s revived Labour party might defeat […]
[…] experimental than strategic, but it was definitely offensive rather than defensive, and was part of an ongoing development program within the bowels of the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence establishments. Re: the comments in Lobster 45 p. 24, subhead ‘Monkey business?’, the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations poured millions into women’s studies, black studies, and […]
[…] would sack a large number of ageing officers and have a smaller Washington headquarters working with a larger number of agents through third nations – use the intelligence forces of other countries rather than the CIA – which was implemented by Nixon in ’72 or so. But the whole idea, which involved the material […]
[…] in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi […]
[…] tungsten, a ‘strategic’ metal, became embroiled in the region’s indigenous organised crime and began what Marshall, after P.D.Scott, calls the ‘government-gang symbiosis……. The common nexus between narcotics, intelligence, ultraright nationalism, organized crime, and respectable politics in Asia has thus had ominous parallels in the United States.’ (p. 461) This esssay makes a very interesting […]
[…] Panamanian military in April. Harari used his position to become kingpin in Israeli trade with Panama – trade not only in commercial goods but also in US intelligence intercepted in Panama. Allegations have also been made that US high technology found its way to Israel through Harari’s network. Harari’s main contact in the US […]
[…] left to say. In the absence of evidence of the Iraqi regime’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, to the distress of the professional diplomats and most of their intelligence services, the Bush-Blair ‘allies’ used dodgy information from defectors, selectively edited what other information they had, or simply made it up as part of the ‘perception […]
