[…] – with G. K. Young prominent – needed reigning in. They were too expensive and too embarrassing when things went wrong. White wanted SIS to be an intelligence service – yes, with clandestine sources – but also one which, he could assure his colleagues in Whitehall, would not embarrass them. No more coup plotting […]
[…] largely unaware that he had been marked down as a dangerous enemy of the centralised British political system. According to the former MI5 officer David Shayler, the intelligence services file on Owen Oyston was re-examined in 1992 by the head of MI5, when it looked as if Neil Kinnock’s revived Labour party might defeat […]
[…] this field, they commented on ‘The increasing number of persons contacting us for assistance in ending what they believe to be electronic harassment by elements of U.S. Intelligence’. The July issue of their magazine Unclassified (discussed above) has a couple of pages on ‘microwave harassment’. That ANSC is giving credence to the microwave/mind control […]
[…] experimental than strategic, but it was definitely offensive rather than defensive, and was part of an ongoing development program within the bowels of the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence establishments. Re: the comments in Lobster 45 p. 24, subhead ‘Monkey business?’, the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations poured millions into women’s studies, black studies, and […]
[…] the perceptions of the American tax-payer and the subject populations of the informal American empire. (Alternatively, this shows how loyal American academics helped the military and the intelligence services win the war with communism.) My problem with it is that I know nothing at all about ‘modern communication theory’ or its practitioners; and learning, […]
[…] in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi […]
[…] Ethnos. In all three cases Crozier and a large team of researchers, with financial support from Goldsmith and additional aid from a large cast of (chiefly US) intelligence officers, tried to find proof of KGB influence that would satisfy a court. This is far too long to describe and I would merely summarise it […]
[…] to them; on other issues that clearly bore on the question of war, like decolonisation, Europe, and the economy; on possible extraneous influences, like business and the intelligence community; on strands of Labour opinion outside the parliamentary party – trade unions, Fabians, pressure groups, and at constituency level; and a little further back in […]
[…] left to say. In the absence of evidence of the Iraqi regime’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, to the distress of the professional diplomats and most of their intelligence services, the Bush-Blair ‘allies’ used dodgy information from defectors, selectively edited what other information they had, or simply made it up as part of the ‘perception […]
[…] (emphasis added) when even we had them over a year before, and No. 10 Downing Street, two years before. He attributed to us a ‘conviction’ (‘that disloyal intelligence officers were behind every humiliation that Wilson suffered’) which we don’t have, and announced, as if it were a revelation, that the rumours about Marcia and […]
