[…] claimed to be confidential briefings “off the record”. The real reason which could not be told publicly for our entry to the common market was because our intelligence service had learned the Soviet Unions had plans to invade Western Europe and these would be carried out once the trade unions in Western Europe led […]
[…] As Phillips describes it, the British state and its politicians declined to do anything about this even though they were warned repeatedly throughout the 1990s by other intelligence services and other states. Phillips attributes this inactivity to a combination of political reluctance to tackle something as sensitive as immigration and concern about the impact […]
[…] left to say. In the absence of evidence of the Iraqi regime’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, to the distress of the professional diplomats and most of their intelligence services, the Bush-Blair ‘allies’ used dodgy information from defectors, selectively edited what other information they had, or simply made it up as part of the ‘perception […]
[…] These included the Miami Showband killings of July 1975. Besides this forensic evidence Holroyd had knowledge of the history of these guns. He knew, through his own intelligence work, two of those involved in the massacre and that they were ‘used’ by a RUC Special Branch officer, who he has named. That officer Holroyd […]
[…] Snr’s Secretary of State. (66) Another Halliburton director, Ray Hunt, of Dallas based Hunt Oil Co. and a major Bush donor, serves on George W. Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (67) Other directors include Hunt’s son who served on Bush’s energy transition team, along with fellow director C.J. ‘Pete’ Silas. (68) In the circumstances, […]
Ismael Hossein-Zadeh New York and London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006 $75.00 (US), £37.99 (UK), h/b This is an interesting and timely book and it is a great pity it is so expensive. Put out as a paperback and maybe with a less academic-sounding title, this would sell. Little of it is intellectually taxing and any […]
[…] had gained in popular strength, although its steady infiltration of the Iranian government and other institutions continued’.(69) As for the Tudeh’s attempting a coup, a State Department intelligence report of January 1953 noted that ‘an open Tudeh move for power……would probably unite independents and non-communists of all political leanings and would result……in energetic efforts […]
[…] into the Atlanticist circuit Briefly told, Ramparts magazine disclosed that the work Martin and his colleagues had defended had, for many years, been funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.(8) The fuller story of how student politicians from the Cold War onwards eased into the state establishment – Draper being only the most recent example […]
[…] zealous control for the next twenty years’ — and never mentions it again. Mangold tries to explain Angleton’s enormous power wholly by his being head of Counter Intelligence. This is not convincing. Surely part of Angleton’s bureaucratic power came precisely from the “Israeli account’. The book is essentially an account of the disastrous effects […]
[…] for Viereck (who had nothing to do with the OTO), but there’s a good argument to be made that A.C. also snitched on Viereck’s activity to British intelligence. L. Ron Hubbard, I am convinced, was no spook – just a con man who fleeced Parsons. Parsons had to sell his mansion, which deprived Aleister […]
