Lobster Issue 43 (Summer 2002)
[…] eye-opening but unsuccessful spell in the real economy, into retirement as a country gentleman – that kind of rebel! Notes 14 There is nothing which throws light on the report in The Times of 2 April 2002 that Lord Carrington the Foreign Secretary had ignored reports of invasion fears coming from the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Lobster Issue 28 (December 1994)
[…] fill a 600-page volume called Compromised by John Cummings and Terry Reed, published by SPI books (New York, 1994, $23.95) Briefly: Terry Reed functioned as an army intelligence officer during Vietnam, turning to civilian spookery in the late 70s. In 1982 he met Oliver North, who posed as a CIA agent named John Cathey. […]
Lobster Issue 46 (Winter 2003)
[…] it could not be won on the basis of anything less than a massive deployment of troops well beyond what was politically acceptable. This was Ellsberg’s human intelligence, as opposed to the ‘Humint’ variety of wishful thinking the president’s men were peddling. But presidents down the line were continually presented with wishful thinking from […]
Lobster Issue 41 (Summer 2001)
[…] Leftism; editor Thomas on ‘Reich and Little Rock’; a snippet on Cord Meyer, Mary Meyer, James Angleton et al; and a long extract from Charles Ameringer’s U.S.Foreign Intelligence: the Secret Side of American History. The first volume is the better of the two if you want information; the second contains a couple of long […]
Lobster Issue 32 (December 1996)
[…] in an effort to dissuade them from protesting the basing of nuclear armed Cruise missiles on British soils. If the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had just played their cards cooly, Kim Besly would have remained a foot soldier in the battle against American imperialism. However one thing led to […]
Lobster Issue 50 (Winter 2005/6)
[…] and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.’ In his interesting short […]