Lobster Issue 46 (Winter 2003)
[…] in 2003, advised Blair against providing anything more than moral support for the US invasion. (9) There was no enthusiasm in the Foreign Office and the defence, intelligence and security establishments were divided.(10) Reasons for the depth of opposition included distrust of the ambitions of the George W. Bush administration, anxiety about isolation from […]
Lobster Issue 45 (Summer 2003)
[…] the EU to the British people. These propaganda campaigns did little to educate people about the realities of EU membership and they significantly out-spent the campaigns of Eurosceptics. As such they effectively undermined the democratic process. The case stands. Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, (London: John Murray, 2001)
Lobster Issue 30 (December 1995)
[…] had gained in popular strength, although its steady infiltration of the Iranian government and other institutions continued’.(69) As for the Tudeh’s attempting a coup, a State Department intelligence report of January 1953 noted that ‘an open Tudeh move for power……would probably unite independents and non-communists of all political leanings and would result……in energetic efforts […]
Lobster Issue 37 (Summer 1999)
[…] be trying to ignore the CIA’s ‘confession’, even less attention has been paid to revelations of the retired Uraguyan Admiral Eladio Moll, one time head of Uraguay’s intelligence service. In July last year Moll testified before a Uraguayan congressional commission about ‘the gringo doctrine’ – ie the instructions from the US to its ‘allies’ […]
Lobster Issue 39 (Summer 2000)
[…] aural carriers, in the very low or very high audio frequency range or in the adjacent ultrasonic frequency spectrum, are amplitude or frequency modulated with the desired intelligence and propagated acoustically or vibrationally, for inducement into the brain, typically through the use of loudspeakers, earphones or piezoelectric transducers.’ (US Patent #5,159,703, 27 October 1992. […]
Lobster Issue 50 (Winter 2005/6)
[…] and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.’ In his interesting short […]