Puppet Masters: the Political Use of Terrorism in Italy Phillip Willan Phillip Willan’s Puppet Masters: the Political Use of Terrorism in Italy, (Constable, London, 1991) is a detailed and interesting book, dealing in a thorough (if partially flawed) way with a fascinating subject. It covers a wide array of interlocking subjects including the infamous P2 … Read more
[…] election, and most important of all, Sean O’Callaghan. O’Callaghan figures in McDonald’s account as an ex IRA man, but perhaps a better characterisation would be ex Irish intelligence agent. He has become ‘a pivotal behind the scenes player’, acting as liaison between Trimble and the loyalist paramilitaries and playing a key role in devising […]
[…] the use of her typewriter; to George Mallalieu for the cover drawing; and to Colin Challen at Voice for speedy printing. THE LOBSTER is a journal/newsletter about intelligence activities, para-politics, state structures and so forth. (The range of our interests should be obvious from this issue) We welcome articles, notes, clippings, corrections of our […]
[…] a camera with a long lens can seem like a gun as it is pointed over a wall. The chances are that he was working for British Intelligence.’ Geraghty forthrightly condemns the Heath Government’s hard line policy, providing the fascinating detail that senior ministers had urged ‘an unlawful “shoot-to-kill” policy’ on the Army, but […]
[…] eye-opening but unsuccessful spell in the real economy, into retirement as a country gentleman – that kind of rebel! Notes 14 There is nothing which throws light on the report in The Times of 2 April 2002 that Lord Carrington the Foreign Secretary had ignored reports of invasion fears coming from the Joint Intelligence Committee.
[…] a quick skim across Massiter, Bettaney, Charles Elwell – and thence into British Briefing, David Hart etc. (And Colin Wallace was not ‘a former officer in Army Intelligence’; and has not, to my knowledge, suggested that the League had office space in MI5 headquarters . But since this, like most of the assertions in […]
[…] it could not be won on the basis of anything less than a massive deployment of troops well beyond what was politically acceptable. This was Ellsberg’s human intelligence, as opposed to the ‘Humint’ variety of wishful thinking the president’s men were peddling. But presidents down the line were continually presented with wishful thinking from […]
[…] decline. Most of all, the UK is no longer a world military power but merely a cash-strapped proxy for the US, dependent upon US weapons systems and intelligence from the US-dominated global surveillance system. (I don’t take seriously recent newspapers stories about the UK creating a defensive missile screen and building – or acquiring […]
[…] Oswald would not have been any sensible person’s choice for a co-conspirator. He was a ‘loner’, mixed-up, of questionable reliability and an unknown quantity to any professional intelligence service. As to charges that the Commission’s report was a rush job, it emerged three months after the deadline originally set. But to the degree that […]
[…] the U.S.’s many covert and overt anti-Soviet operations of the 1980s. As you might expect with the author’s track record of accepting what the U.S. and U.K. intelligence services tell him, there is no consideration – none; not a line – of the massive critiques of the KGB-done-it thesis by Edward Herman and others […]
