[…] attributed to Harold Covington, described as the ‘outside influence to bring together several disparate factions and groupings into C18’ (p. 2). There was speculation of a possible intelligence input, that of the ‘South African state security services’ (p. 3), though the only evidence offered was the presence of some anti-Apartheid individuals on the Redwatch […]
[…] either conciliate or effectively repress the Zionists, the British were doomed. The lack of a viable political strategy showed itself on the ground in the lack of intelligence. Intelligence is the key to operational success in counterinsurgency and the British signally failed to penetrate the Zionist resistance. The scale of the failure is shown […]
[…] does not mention that Knight was a leading member of the British Fascists and seems to have colluded with them against the left while he was an intelligence officer. Professor Andrew notes that an MI5 agent, James McGuirk Hughes (whose name Andrew misspells), became the British Union of Fascists’ head of intelligence, presenting this […]
[…] and propaganda. The name reminds me of the Institute for the Study of Conflict and this may turn out to be another in the evolving sequence of intelligence fronts which includes ISC, Forum World Features and Control Risks. Moral Re-armament MRA last appeared on the fringes of the miners’ strike. Now Manchester Chief Constable […]
[…] 1969. During the Vietnam War the GCHQ monitoring station at Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong (UKC 201 in the international Sigint network) provided the Americans with intelligence up to 1975, long after Harold Wilson had – publicly at least – expressed his Government’s opposition to the war. The NSA co-ordinated all signals intelligence […]
[…] her comments at Kwiatkowski is dropping broad hints that, in her view, there is something fishy here. In ‘Pakistan and 9/11’, at B. Raman, a former Indian intelligence officer, discusses advance knowledge of 9-11 among Pakistan’s intelligence community and concludes: ‘It is, therefore, impossible that the Pakistani authorities would not have known of Al […]
[…] Thabo Mbeki, or their ministers, civil servants, diplomats and generals. They will be able to target opposition politicians too. They will become immensely powerful. If adequate artificial intelligence applications could be developed – what are called ‘Turing Test-compliant’ artificial intelligence applications – it would soon become affordable to target millions of people with automated […]
[…] ‘……the armed forces, police or national security services‘ – a phrase whose time is a-coming, I think; a little hint of the amalgamation of the security and intelligence services now being talked of. (See Corinne Souza’s piece in Lobster 40.) Things reptilian Despite my best efforts to avoid David Icke’s nonsensical ravings a dollop […]
[…] latterly of USIS. It was Mr. Romerstein who accused me of recycling Soviet disinformation, and who, I would guess, is the source of the rumours in US intelligence circles that the KGB were funding Lobster. Another SIS memoir SIS buffs might like to check the Journal of Contemporary History, July 1995, in which former […]
[…] to your case, and are unable to assist you further.’ Kennedy wrote to the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, three times in June/July 1999. The replies, from the Intelligence and Security Liaison Unit of the Home Office Organised and International Crime Directorate (12 August 1999) and from the Home Secretary’s Advisory Board, Metropolitan Police Committee […]
