[…] 1997 in a search for papers relating to Fininvest. (19) Very little paper work had survived, however. Many papers had been shredded to save space. (20) Berlusconi’s intelligence connections are unclear, as are Andersen’s. They have been his long-term accountants since he made his first fortune in a Milanese housing deal politically leveraged by […]
[…] Independent on Sunday. Friends of ‘the friends’ McShane was joined by his former New Labour Foreign Office colleague Lord Foulkes in speaking on behalf of the British intelligence services and calling for the early ending of the inquest into the death of Princess Diana. Whereas McShane’s rise in Labour politics was through trade union […]
[…] system behaved far more rationally – better for the bottom line. They work very hard, attending sessions from dawn to nearly midnight, but expect the standards of intelligence and analysis to be the best available in the entire world. They are impatient. They have a hard time reconciling long term issues (global warming, AIDS […]
[…] latterly of USIS. It was Mr. Romerstein who accused me of recycling Soviet disinformation, and who, I would guess, is the source of the rumours in US intelligence circles that the KGB were funding Lobster. Another SIS memoir SIS buffs might like to check the Journal of Contemporary History, July 1995, in which former […]
[…] she shows why there has been recent stalemate over the RUC. This armed police force was pivotal in much of the action and most of the floating intelligence in the past. Could the same people provide an equitable police force for all the people of Northern Ireland? To mix metaphors somewhat, the description she […]
[…] CIA in mind), as “a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished.” This term referred chiefly, but not exclusively, to the world of intelligence agencies and similar organizations, where secrecy and covert operations were adopted as a matter of deliberate policy. ‘I still see value in this definition and mode […]
[…] either conciliate or effectively repress the Zionists, the British were doomed. The lack of a viable political strategy showed itself on the ground in the lack of intelligence. Intelligence is the key to operational success in counterinsurgency and the British signally failed to penetrate the Zionist resistance. The scale of the failure is shown […]
[…] of the Cuban Missile Crisis http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/ Includes a detailed chronology of events relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis; images of Soviet missile installations and declassified documents: declassified intelligence reports, national security memoranda, cables, letters and summaries. CIA’s Historical Review Programwww.foia.ucia.gov/net_princeton.htm Analytic reports on the former Soviet Union produced by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence […]
[…] her comments at Kwiatkowski is dropping broad hints that, in her view, there is something fishy here. In ‘Pakistan and 9/11’, at B. Raman, a former Indian intelligence officer, discusses advance knowledge of 9-11 among Pakistan’s intelligence community and concludes: ‘It is, therefore, impossible that the Pakistani authorities would not have known of Al […]
[…] Thabo Mbeki, or their ministers, civil servants, diplomats and generals. They will be able to target opposition politicians too. They will become immensely powerful. If adequate artificial intelligence applications could be developed – what are called ‘Turing Test-compliant’ artificial intelligence applications – it would soon become affordable to target millions of people with automated […]
