[…] had stood unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1918, founded the Britons Society and spoke at public meetings with Hitler, in Munich, in 1923. Domville, an ex-Director of Naval Intelligence, ran The Link which had 4300 members in June 1939 including two cousins of Neville Chamberlain who were still active in local government in Birmingham. The […]
[…] large. He regarded the army’s methods as ‘thorough rather than inspired’ and instead developed his own approach. This involved using his own troops as collectors of background intelligence which he made operational use of, rather than just relying on Special Branch or acting blind.(5) His growing reputation as a counter-insurgency specialist saw him go […]
[…] in parapolitics in the United States. And not before time. The interest in conspiracies is simply reality breaking through. The Reagan-Thatcher years saw unprecedented expansions of unregulated intelligence and military agencies, and breathtaking multi-billion rip-offs (most obviously, in the U.S., the S and L scam; in the UK, privatisation). No one should be remotely […]
[…] Wilson’s Cabinet Office is infiltrated. Rhodesian agents murder one of their own operatives who has turned against them in London, and another agent is killed by British intelligence after they and Special Branch monitor his activities. The agent, Geoff Dominy ….’ (emphasis added) Typical of Searchlight to make a startling allegation without offering any […]
[…] either conciliate or effectively repress the Zionists, the British were doomed. The lack of a viable political strategy showed itself on the ground in the lack of intelligence. Intelligence is the key to operational success in counterinsurgency and the British signally failed to penetrate the Zionist resistance. The scale of the failure is shown […]
[…] attributed to Harold Covington, described as the ‘outside influence to bring together several disparate factions and groupings into C18’ (p. 2). There was speculation of a possible intelligence input, that of the ‘South African state security services’ (p. 3), though the only evidence offered was the presence of some anti-Apartheid individuals on the Redwatch […]
[…] text of a speech given by Fidel Castro the day after the shooting. Fidel’s speech is rather striking: 24 hours after the shooting he – or his intelligence people – had already spotted the attempts in the immediate aftermath to portray Oswald as pro-Soviet and pro-Castro. We get letters from Kruschev to Castro; we […]
[…] 1997 in a search for papers relating to Fininvest. (19) Very little paper work had survived, however. Many papers had been shredded to save space. (20) Berlusconi’s intelligence connections are unclear, as are Andersen’s. They have been his long-term accountants since he made his first fortune in a Milanese housing deal politically leveraged by […]
[…] WIA reply. I sometimes had niggling doubts about Lundy’s defence that it was part of his job to mingle with the criminal fraternity in order to gain intelligence and develop his strategy of using informers. These are relatively minor doubts, though, since his record on convictions does look highly impressive. More suspect is his […]
[…] her comments at Kwiatkowski is dropping broad hints that, in her view, there is something fishy here. In ‘Pakistan and 9/11’, at B. Raman, a former Indian intelligence officer, discusses advance knowledge of 9-11 among Pakistan’s intelligence community and concludes: ‘It is, therefore, impossible that the Pakistani authorities would not have known of Al […]
