Robert Parry Sheridan Square Press, New York, 1993 ISBN 1-879823-08-X This is an account both of the October Surprise story and of the author’s attempts over two years to stand it up. This works at several levels. The first is an intelligible recounting of the main features of the developing October Surprise allegations. He reviews … Read more
James Jesus Angleton and the ‘Third Way’ The CIA counter- intelligence expert James Angleton has for years been regarded as one of the keenest of cold warriors, who turned the CIA inside out in the search for Soviet ‘moles’ and ultimately had to be retired to prevent further damage to the Agency. But interesting […]
[…] aristocrats and eccentric M.Ps or forces which were much more powerfully rooted in the structure of the British State? What was their relationship with the security and intelligence services? Why did Churchill feel the need to have his own intelligence adviser, Sir Desmond Morton? Costello seems to believe that the pro-appeasement faction was powerful […]
[…] talked about Saddam Hussein in Iraq…But at that time…..the Democrats had occupied the White House for the previous eight years. So he was not privy to any intelligence whatsoever…he didn’t know what kind of situation the weapons of mass destruction was at that time.’ () About Open Government The first issue of About Open […]
[…] Pilger refers to the SAS fighting in Vietnam ‘with US special forces’. Again, I checked in Curtis and he cites one sentence from Bloch and Fitzgerald’s British Intelligence and Covert Action. which describes SAS personnel being attached to New Zealand and Australian SAS units. Well, I have no reason to doubt them; and no […]
[…] Tribunal. The IPT is the body set up under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) to hear complaints relating to conduct by the Security and Intelligence agencies, and complaints about phone-tapping. It also deals with claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, s7(1)(a) that a public authority has acted in a manner […]
[…] pro quo for the pension he is now receiving, is to bolster the key myth of MI6, that while we may be the junior partner in the intelligence relationship with the U.S., we’re the best, the most subtle and the most reliable — the people to handle those uncouth Yanks, to hold their hands […]
[…] In the House of Commons on 14 December 1977 Stephen Hastings MP, a former MI6 officer, using Parliamentary privilege, ran the disinformation attributed to the former Czech intelligence officer Joseph Frolik that a group of British trade unions leaders were ‘agents’ of Soviet intelligence. Frolik was being run by the CIA. (p. 321) These […]
[…] Dansey have given such a bizarre and terrible mission to Dericourt? Timewatch argued that Dansey hated SOE, regarding it as a nuisance which disrupted the gathering of intelligence from Occupied Europe. If one of SOE’s most important operations could be sabotaged, then the organisation could be taken over by MI6, and attention could be […]
[…] (p. 6) It defies belief to think that anti-fascists would deliberately admit to covertly monitoring fascist meetings from within the same premises: such would alert Nazi “counter- intelligence”. This points, therefore, to the state having at least one, or maybe more, operatives inside the local BNP, and them being very confident indeed. ‘(Emphasis added) […]
