A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the abuse of America’s intelligence agencies James Bamford, New York: Doubleday, 2004, h/back, $26.95 Ghost Wars: The Secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 Steve Coll New York: Penguin, 2004, h/back, $29.95 These books cover some […]
[…] evidence, though I do intend pursuing it further. Obviously such a shadowy company is open to all kinds of theories. It could have been used for economic intelligence, as suggested by Shaw. Equally, it could have been used to finance politicians. But where is the evidence for any of that? If there is such […]
[…] of the judiciary from the state executive being almost entirely eroded. The criminalisation of foreigners and of dissent increased, beginning with the Asylum Act of 1993 and Intelligence and Security Act of 1994, after which rival law enforcement agencies began competing with the police.(12) Although MI5 made much of its anti-fascist credentials in the […]
[…] knows what it is doing about civil disorder. It is fishing. As the facts come out, they often seem to fit into the standard pattern of poor intelligence and some mistreatment of those arrested. We remain convinced that miscarriages of justice are likely in this mismanaged chaos. We have noted the signs of a […]
[…] but is incapable of turning the analysis round: what has US foreign policy persistently done in the past? Who says the CIA and the assortment of other intelligence organisations stopped what they were doing just because the NED was put in front of them as a fig leaf? Might these criticisms also apply to […]
[…] text. In 1984 Crozier wrote to the Spectator attacking IPS director Richard Barnet (a former Kennedy aide) and accusing the IPS of being ‘a front for Cuban intelligence, itself controlled by the KGB’. Barnet sued, the litigation reaching a climax in 1986 when Crozier lost a key court battle to prevent the Spectator retracting. […]
[…] about dealing with the unrest among the natives by the classic Imperial methods which had worked so well in Malaya against the Communist guerillas – a co-ordinated intelligence drive, a big propaganda campaign, mass round-ups of suspects, attacks on guerillas’ arms-supplies and cross-border sanctuaries – and then, if all else failed, negotiations from strength. […]
[…] place under a Labour government again (Cf the ABC case in 1977-8), and that the Labour Party doesn’t know how to deal with national security and the intelligence services. Dorril said authors are under a lot of pressure to cooperate with the D-notice Committee; if they refuse to cooperate, their books are sometimes passed […]
[…] full support’ but warned against premature action liable to backfire. Meanwhile the CIA agents and their friends in Chile were to deploy ‘propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure’ to secure the downfall of the Allende regime.(4) Of course Allende’s left-wing government, the first […]
[…] area by country of origin and courses attended. A parallel area of training that we know even less about is the training of foreign Special Branch and intelligence agents. Security training is arranged through the Metropolitan Special Branch and MI5. Courses are also run by the Defence Intelligence Staff at Ashford, Kent. SAVAK agents […]
