[…] summarise here, and 167 Summer 2010 they have been debated hotly before Horne even got to them. What seems incontestable is Horne’s finding that the National Photo Intelligence Center in Washington received the Zapruder film from a CIA lab at Kodak in Rochester, and that the anonymous ‘Bill Smith’ who delivered it said it […]
[PDF file]: […] proposed rule changes. I am sure this exercise will have involved at some point party staff too, herding their constituency delegates in the right direction and sharing intelligence on the recalcitrant. Largely because of the lukewarm response from the trade unions, McSweeney didn’t get everything that he asked for, but the changes that were […]
[PDF file]: […] I did correspondence, etc.’ This is interesting because the Allied occupation of West Germany ended in May 1955, leaving four more years unaccounted for in Dr Lewinson’s intelligence career pre-CIA. (Dr Lewinson remarks that she spent five years in Munich at some time during this 1946-59 period.) The apparent implication is that Dr Lewinson’s […]
[PDF file]: […] in a hut on the Spanish side of the fence. The future Soviet double agent Kim Philby had also recently been in Gibraltar, serving as British counter- intelligence chief in Iberia. The simultaneous presence of Maisky and Sikorski in Gibraltar proved tricky for Mason-Macfarlane.15 He had negotiated in Moscow in 1942 to persuade Stalin […]
[PDF file]: […] was red meat for her base. As we know, the death penalty was not re-introduced. In fact, Thatcher had been briefed for some time by UK military intelligence that she could not realistically fight the IRA head–on (as Neave would have wished) and the likelihood was that high levels of violence would continue unless […]
[PDF file]: […] Britain and Saudi Arabia which led to allegations of massive corruption. The investigation was closed down by the Blair government when the Saudis threatened to end their intelligence relationship with Britain if it was pursued.4 He gave hundreds of thousands of pounds to the Conservative Party and made a donation of £20 million to […]
[PDF file]: […] had any impact on their recipients in terms of altering their behaviour – not even the alarms triggered by the Able Archer exercise, which a lone Russian intelligence officer decided to ignore.1 Often these nuclear threats and alerts have been described as essential to US credibility. That magic word was also used in 2008, […]
[PDF file]: […] ‘the iron curtain’, e.g. how many missiles the Soviets had, etc., was unknown and the ‘danger’ belief was just viable. By 1960 it was clear to US intelligence and military that the Soviet Union was a nuclear minnow, compared to the US. That ‘danger’ was the rationalisation for the CIA’s activities. There was no […]
