The Ultranationalist Right in Turkey and the Attempted Assassination of Pope John Paul II

Introduction

Like most dramatic and unsettling political events, the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II by Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca temporarily captured the imagination of the world’s media and political pundits. Although the initial public outrage and concern generally faded once it became clear that the Pope would survive, certain individuals and groups have pursued the issue for a much longer period, usually for political reasons. As a result, a considerable literature about the crime has already appeared, most of which has focussed on tracing its background, reconstructing its successive phases, and determining its ultimate sponsorship and purposes. Yet as of this writing no consensus has been reached about many of the elements in the unfolding plot. This is perhaps not surprising given its potentially explosive political ramifications; and indeed, these very ramifications have encouraged the type of politically-motivated speculation that has in the main only served to obscure the actual events behind layers of falsehood. Before these layers become too dense to penetrate, more serious research needs to be undertaken so that various contentious issues can be clarified and certain spurious claims can be exposed.

Among the major controversies that are still raging, two that have particular importance are the interrelated questions of Agca’s organisational affiliations and motives for trying to kill the Pope. Since these are complicated subjects that cannot possibly be dealt with in their entirety here, (1) I will focus my attention on two narrower issues. Firstly, what elements in the Turkish extreme right was Agca affiliated with? (2) And secondly, could this affiliation in and of itself have provided him with a strong motive to try and murder the Pope? Although these particular questions are not terribly difficult to answer if one is familiar with the historical background of various Turkish political groupings and ideological currents, most of those who have sought to analyse ‘the plot to kill the Pope’ lack precisely this familiarity. (3) One result is that both those who accept and those who deny the possibility of an indigenous Turkish sponsorship of the papal assassination attempt have usually made fundamental interpretive errors, or, at the very least, oversimplified assessments. Although the purpose of this article is to rectify that situation by shedding more light on the political milieu Agca emerged from inside Turkey, it should be emphasised that although the argument will be made that this milieu provided him with both a motive and the wherewithal to shoot the Pope, this does not necessarily mean that indigenous Turkish forces were solely or even primarily responsible for it. Given the limitations of the currently available data pertaining to this event, it would foolish to foreclose other possibilities or come to definitive conclusions about its ultimate sponsorship.

The existing literature

Before turning to an analysis of these two issues, it is first necessary to provide an overview of both the existing literature and the major theories about the assassination plot. The literature on this topic is already extensive and continues to proliferate, but the bulk of it is highly problematic, albeit for diverse reasons. For simplicity’s sake, it can be divided into three major categories, each of which mainly includes publications with clear rightist or leftist biases. However, these categories are not entirely discrete and it is often quite difficult to be certain just which category a given work falls into. (4)

The first such category is literature which is consciously produced and/or disseminated for propaganda purposes, often by people with direct or indirect links to the intelligence services of countries that are members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. These works, being designed primarily to manipulate public perceptions and thereby generate support for the adoption of certain desired policies, contain a considerable amount of disinformation and sometimes appear to constitute components of more extensive psychological operations. (5) This type of literature is by now quite common on both sides. On the Western side, (6) it includes the highly influential books by Paul B. Henze (7) and Claire Sterling, (8) lesser-known works by Vendelin Slugenov (9) and Giovanni Bensi, (10) and a host of articles and TV commentaries by other terrorism ‘experts’ like Alexandre de Marenches, (11) Michael A. Ledeen, (12) Ray S. Cline, (13) and probably Vittorofranco N. Pisano. (14) Much of this material seems to reflect the interests of extreme right-wing factions within various Western intelligence agencies, not necessarily the views of those agencies as a whole. (15) On the Eastern side, one can cite a number of official Bulgarian and Soviet publications, (16) as well as those produced by pro-Soviet Western communists, whether or nor they are actually members of official communist parties or front groups. (17) To say that all of these works seem designed mainly to exploit propaganda themes is not to say that all of the information contained in them is false, since propaganda is most effective when it judiciously mixes truth and falsehood. (18) However, although there is some useful material in virtually all of these works, one should never accept them at face value or forget that they were produced for propagandist purposes.

The second major category consists of literature which naively or uncritically incorporates propaganda or disinformation themes, and thereby both obscures their sources and aids in their dissemination to a wider audience. This constitutes by far the largest category on the Western side, ranging from superficial journalistic treatments and commentaries to pseudo-scholarly articles. (19) On the Eastern side it is hard to tell just how extensive this category is, despite the exaggerated claims that are frequently made about the effectiveness of Soviet disinformation campaigns and other ‘active measures’. (20) Although Soviet propaganda is certainly recycled in a large number of relatively orthodox far left publications, (21) it is often difficult to determine if this is done consciously by Soviet-controlled agents – which would place it within the first category – or unwittingly by communist sympathisers with an idealised view of the Soviet Union. Either way, such propaganda is rarely picked up by mainstream conservative and liberal publications in the West which, if anything, tend to gullibly accept and promote the propaganda lines of their own governments. (22) In any event, the literature in this category usually adds little in the way of new information and – like that in the first category – is generally produced by people who are clearly sympathetic to the cause of one side or another, who apply critical reasoning only to the arguments of the opposition, if they do so at all.

The third and final category, literature produced by researchers with relatively independent and critical minds, is unfortunately the smallest. On the right side of the political spectrum, only one article specifically dealing with the papal plot comes to mind, (23) although there are some fine academic studies of terrorism per se with a conservative or rightist bias. (24) On the left, this category is dominated by the work of Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, the most recent of which is, despite some problems, the single most thorough and intelligent analysis of the subject to have appeared so far. (25) Here too can be found some excellent articles (26) and two important book-length studies by Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu. (27) Also in this category are several fine articles by political moderates, especially Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post. (28) Predictably, this type of literature has often been studiously ignored or viciously smeared by the dogmatic partisans on both sides, and, as a result, the latter’s widely disseminated propaganda and disinformation has generally had an impact disproportionate to its actual value.

The major theories

The major theories that have been proffered concerning the alleged sponsorship of the ‘plot to kill the Pope’ are also three in number, although each can be found in somewhat different variants. In most cases, they grow logically out of the particular biases of their proponents, but, as I hope to demonstrate, only one of them is thoroughly based on reliable evidence. The first is the theory that the Soviet KGB, acting through a chain of intermediaries, including the surrogate Bulgarian KDS (later DS, Committee for State Security), a branch of the Turkish mafia headquartered in Sofia, and elements of an extreme right-wing Turkish paramilitary organisation, the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), recruited Agca and arranged the assassination attempt. (29) The motive is ascribed to Politburo fears that Pope John Paul II, a Polish ex-cardinal named Karol Wojtya, would fuel popular opposition to the Soviet-backed regime in Poland, and perhaps also in other eastern European countries. (30) Proponents of this ‘Bulgarian connection’ differ about certain important details – e.g. the precise point at which Agca was supposedly recruited by East bloc intelligence (31) – but all agree that the Soviets had both a strong motive and the technical means to plan and direct such an operation. Although I don’t think any fair-minded observer could legitimately quibble with these latter notions, (32) Soviet and Bulgarian writers have predictably denied it, (33) and even otherwise perceptive researchers have downplayed it. (34) The chief problem with this ‘KGB plot’ thesis is that almost all of the evidence is contaminated or otherwise unreliable, consisting of Agca’s often fantastic and contradictory statements, (35) information intentionally ‘leaked’ by various unnamed intelligence sources that can neither be traced nor independently verified, (36) the problematic testimony of several Soviet bloc defectors, (37) and the many unsupported assertions and suppositions of intelligence-linked disinformationists. (38)

To these evidentiary problems must also be added others of a logical nature. First of all, would the Soviet leadership, however paranoid, be foolish enough to initiate an operation that millions of people – especially Poles – would automatically assume they were behind and would thus probably serve to catalyse the very unrest and opposition they hoped to defuse in eastern Europe? (39) More importantly, is it likely that the KGB and DS, professional intelligence organisations whose efficiency is usually touted by Western ‘experts’, (40) would systematically violate virtually all of the most elementary rules of trade-craft and agent-handling by, among other things,

• hiring an emotionally unstable person as a triggerman; (41)
• employing an unusually large number of support personnel (which could adversely affect the maintenance of secrecy); (42)
• bringing Agca to Sofia for sixty days and allowing him to stay at the highly-visible Hotel Vitosha; (43)
• sending him – a notorious Turkish assassin whose activities were well- known to Western police and security forces (44) – to several European countries for a lengthy stay prior to the actual assassination attempt; (45)
• and arranging for Bulgarian case officers to meet him personally (instead of through intermediaries) to plan the attack? (46)

Such a scenario cannot be completely ruled if one takes possible human errors into account, but all of these factors together make it seem rather implausible.

The second theory is a mirror image of the first, in that the alleged sponsor of the attack on the Pope was the CIA, acting through its intermediaries, which are variously identified as one or more Western intelligence services and the networks of right-wing (including fascist) extremists in Turkey and Europe that they are said to control. (47) Among these purported intermediaries were the Turkish National Intelligence Agency, MIT, (48) Alparslan Turkes’ MHP (Nationalist Action (or Movement) Party) and its affiliated Bozkurt commandos (including Agca himself); (49) Licio Gelli’s ultra-rightist Italo-Argentine Masonic lodge P2; (50) the secret ‘Super S’ faction within the Italian intelligence service SISMI; (51) certain European neo-fascist organisations, and fanatical Catholic ‘integralist’ circles (52); the West German BND, (53) the Israeli MOSSAD (54) and the Vatican’s own intelligence agency; the NATO secret service, (55) and assorted reactionary politicians. This is a scenario that has been promoted almost exclusively by ‘honourable correspondents’ (media intelligence assets) from east Bloc countries and pro-communist authors in the West.

A number of distinct motives for this Western plot have been enumerated, some of which are rather fanciful, (56) but there is virtually unanimous agreement that one of its major purposes was to provide a pretext for launching a fresh propaganda campaign to discredit the Soviet Union and its allies and thereby prevent any thaw in the so-called ‘New Cold War’ being waged by the Reagan administration. (57) However, although the CIA has demonstrable links to most of the above-named organisations and some of its factions have indeed made post-facto covert efforts to attribute the attempted assassination to the KGB, (58) it seems rather unlikely that even the most hawkish American officials would sanction or embark upon such an extreme and risky measure in connection with John Paul II, a conservative on most religious and many political issues. (59) More importantly, even if the case for CIA sponsorship is arguably as compelling as that for KGB sponsorship, (60) the available evidence is by no means sufficient to support the thesis that Agca’s attack on the Pope was orchestrated by US intelligence. (61)

The third and final theory is that the assassination attempt was actually what it initially appeared to be – the effort of a rather unstable and megalomaniacal Turkish ultra-rightist, with the help of some of his comrades and their criminal allies, to eliminate a figure that they perceived, not entirely without justification, to be the symbol of Western and Christian ‘imperialism’. As I shall argue below, this interpretation is entirely consistent with both the ideological milieu from which Agca emerged in Turkey and the bulk of the reliable evidence concerning the plot. In addition to accepting the validity of this ‘first conspiracy’, one that was rooted in indigenous Turkish politics, I believe that said evidence also suggest that there was a ‘second conspiracy’ launched by rightist elements within various Western governments and intelligence services to pin the crime on the Bulgarians and Soviets by manipulating Agca’s testimony, (62) although this will not be covered in any detail here.

A couple of final points need to be emphasised before turning to the question of Agca’s organisational and ideological background. It is clear that the Bulgarians were at least indirectly involved in the crime by virtue of their facilitation of and participation in various arms and drug smuggling operations undertaken by the Sofia-based branch of the Turkish mafia, (63) and one should have no illusions about the so-called ‘morality’ or ‘innocence’ of the Soviets, who extensively and systematically employ similar types of dirty tricks. Secondly, all reconstructions should be regarded as tentative at this point, since they are bound to be affected as new information increasingly becomes available.

Agca’s Political and Ideological Background

Considering the overwhelming amount of evidence linking the young gunman to the Turkish extreme right, the controversy that has arisen about his affiliations and views would be inexplicable without the efforts of various influential polemicists and propagandists to obscure the issue. This is all the more unfortunate in that the initial media reports on Agca’s background were reasonably accurate. Shortly after the assassination attempt in St. Peter’s Square on 13 May 1981, it was reported in newspapers of record throughout the world that Mehmet Ali Agca was associated with the Turkish ultranationalist right, specifically the Bozkurt paramilitary terrorist organisation affiliated with the MHP.(64) Indeed, Agca was one of the most notorious right-wing terrorists in Turkey, since he had previously participated in the 1 February 1979 assassination of the highly-respected editor of the liberal daily Milliyet, Abdi Ipekci. Later, with the help of extreme rightists within the Turkish security forces, he had escaped from the maximum security Kartal-Maltepe military prison in late November of 1979, on the eve of the Pope’s scheduled visit to Turkey. One day after his escape, he wrote a letter to Millieyt threatening to kill the ‘Crusader Commander’ (Hacli Kumandani) if this visit was not cancelled. He did not make good his threat at the time, but with the assistance provided by other Bozkurt comrades he eluded Turkish authorities, acquired financing and weapons, and eventually made his way to St. Peter’s Square for the assassination attempt. In short, the information acquired shortly after the crime clearly revealed Agca’s rightist political background and suggested his likely motives for shooting the Pope, and most of the additional details that have since been uncovered have tended to confirm these early assessments.

However, a number of Eastern and Western regimes had a vested political interest in exploiting the incident for propaganda purposes, so it was probably inevitable that these relatively cogent analyses would come under attack by disinformationists in both camps. (65) Within the Soviet Bloc, the fact that Agca had links to the Turkish far-right was eagerly seised upon, and it quickly led to the elaboration of the above-noted thesis of ultimate CIA sponsorship. On the Western side, the existence of these same links initially posed problems for the propagandists. However, their task was facilitated by a general public awareness that the Soviets were not favorably disposed towards Pope Wojtya, whom they perceived as a troublesome, reactionary meddler in internal eastern European and especially Polish affairs. (66) Agca himself provided further grist for the Western disinformation mills immediately after his arrest hy admitting that he spent nearly two months in Bulgaria and claiming to have undergone training at a left-wing Palestinian guerrilla camp in Lebanon. (67) These two statements originally formed the sole basis of Western attempts to portray Agca as a Soviet bloc assassin, for it was not until May of 1982 – after he had apparently been pressured by members of the Camorra (an Italian ‘mafia’) and coached by Italian secret service agents in Ascoli Piceno prison – that he began to identify the Bulgarians as the sponsors of the attack on the Pope. (68) The ‘Bulgarian connection’ thesis has since been widely propagated in the non-communist media.

‘a false flag operation?’

But Western opinion-shapers were still faced with the difficulty of reconciling Agca’s well-publicised status as a right-wing killer with the notion that he acted in the service of an orthodox pro-Soviet regime. The only way that this could be done was to portray Agca’s attack on the Pope as a ‘false flag’ terrorist operation, i.e. one that was designed to look as though it had been committed by the other side. Although some pro-communist commentators have disparaged this suggestion by falsely claiming that it would be ‘unthinkable’ for a socialist state to employ ‘fascists’, (69) this is a well-known operational technique that has regularly been employed by various Western and Eastern intelligence and security agencies. (70) Among the numerous Western examples that could be provided, one may mention the creation of pseudo Mau Mau ‘counter gangs’ controlled by the British army in Kenya, (71) the establishment of false ‘national liberation’ movements by the Portuguese secret police in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa, (72) bombings in Cairo by an Israeli special operations unit (Unit 131) that were then attributed to anti-Western Egyptians, (73) the directing of a supposed ‘Libyan’ terrorist group – La Llamada de Jesucristo – by a French secret service agent, (74) the systematic utilisation of bogus and real left-wing organisations as a cover by Italian neo-fascist terrorists in the late 1960s and early 1970s, (75) and the apparent creation of an allegedly leftist terrorist organisation (GRAPO) by the Spanish intelligence agency. (76) The evidence is harder to come by for similar activities by communist bloc intelligence services, but one may note the sending of pro-Nazi literature (and, in one case, a bomb) to Western politicians and diplomats, purportedly from the nonexistent Kampfverband fur Unabhangiges Deutschland by Czech intelligence agents, (77) and the possible infiltration and manipulation of right-wing Croatian terrorist groups by the KGB. (76)

Nevertheless, although only a fanatic or a fool could believe that the Soviets would never resort to using such effective provocation techniques to accomplish particular political objectives, it would be equally absurd to claim that they had done so in a given case unless there was at least some reliable evidence to suggest it. (79) Since such evidence was not immediately forthcoming in the Agca case, Western disinformation peddlers like Henze and Sterling were forced to systematically distort the facts about the Turk’s background in order to make it seem as though he was acting under Bulgarian and ultimately Soviet control. This involved promoting two major theses. The first was that Agca was not really a rightist at all, an argument that appears in different variants, including some that are mutually contradictory. The second, promoted by Henze and some pro-Soviet sources, was that Agca was not a Muslim religious fanatic and hence would not have attempted to kill the ‘Crusader Commander’ for the reasons stated in his letter to Millieyt, which must therefore have been designed as a smokescreen to conceal the actual motives. To get at the real story, it is necessary to describe Agca’s political background in some detail.

Agca’s political background

To demonstrate that Agca’s attempt to shoot the Pope was the result of a leftist rather than a rightist plot, Henze and Sterling had to try and show that Agca’s rightist affiliations served primarily as a cover to disguise behind-the-scenes Soviet Bloc control or manipulation. Thus, although Sterling acknowledged that Agca ‘had long moved in right-wing circles’, (80) she and Henze put forth a number of arguments to minimise the significance of this fact. Most of them not only contradict the available evidence, but also suffer from logical inconsistencies. Thus, in an effort to make it appear that Agca was not a ‘typical’ Turkish rightist – whatever that means – Henze and Sterling variously characterise him as a ‘megalomaniac’, (81) and ‘international terrorist’ who transcended conjoined rightist and leftist ideologies, (82) an ‘apolitical’ individual who operated mainly on the basis of greed, (83) a well-trained Soviet ‘hit man’ or secret agent, (84) a leftist sympathiser, (85) and a ‘mentally normal person’. (86) Other proponents of the ‘Bulgarian connection’ portray him as a shrewd but unstable psychopath. (87) Aside from the difficulties inherent in describing any individual’s complex psychological makeup and motivations, it is a priori unlikely that Agca could be all of these contradictory characters rolled into one.

The depictions of Agca’s organisational links and activities by said authors are likewise filled with unresolved contradictions. On the one hand, both Henze and Sterling repeatedly emphasise that Agca was not officially on the membership rolls of the MHP or Bozkurtlar (88) and that there were no confirmed links between Agca and high-ranking MHP officials, including Turkes himself, (89) and Sterling goes so far as to say that ‘all the evidence showed him to be a minor figure on the fringes of [the rightist] movement.’ (90) On the other hand, Agca’s many demonstrable connections to the right are ascribed, at least in part, to an elaborate cover operation devised by his Bulgarian or Soviet handlers. (91) As Herman and Brodhead have correctly pointed out, if these communist intelligence services were in fact engaged in carefully creating a covert rightist ‘legend’ for Agca, they would have made certain that he formally joined one or more extreme right organisations to help strengthen it. (92) After all, ‘false flag’ operations depend for their success on the preservation of such facades.

Henze and Sterling also insist that Agca did not involve himself in the usual sort of rightist political actions, including agitation and violent confrontations with the left. (93) Their clear implication is that his secret communist sponsors did not want to compromise his cover or operational flexibility by allowing him to engage in activities that might lead to his arrest and interrogation. (94) But if this is so, why did they permit him to participate in the dramatic assassination of Ipekci, which was certain to generate extraordinary publicity? Even if we assume that the Soviets had a motive for Ipekci, as well as a need to test Agca’s resourcefulness and loyalty, this is not compatible with the notion of holding Agca in reserve for an especially sensitive future operation. In any case, to have distanced Agca from his militant right-wing comrades by having him avoid daily scuffles would have been to cast undue suspicion on his bona fides. These unsubstantiated hypotheses are already difficult enough to reconcile, but Sterling tries to have it both ways by claiming that it doesn’t even matter whether Agca was on the ‘outer fringe or inner core of the Grey Wolf movement’, since his ‘mysterious connections led to the right and the left alike.’ (95) As we shall see, this latter assertion remains unproven. At this point, it would be better to present an overview of Agca’s manifold rightist affiliations, taking note of controversies and spurious arguments when they arise, than to continue highlighting the many inconsistencies and illogicalities in the accounts of Henze and Sterling.

Agca’s rightist affiliations

Mehmet Ali Agca was born in 1958 and grew up on the outskirts of Malatya in a shanty town (gecekondu) known as Yesiltepe. The death of his father when he was eight years old made it even more difficult for him and his family to eke out a decent existence, (96) but despite this adversity he became a voracious reader and an excellent student. (97) He seems to have met some of his later right-wing comrades (including Yavuz Caylan) at Yesiltepe junior high school, (98) and it is known that Yesiltepe was at that time under rightist control. (99) This latter circumstance, when combined with his Sunni religious beliefs, may well help to explain his early attraction to the right, (100) yet it was not until he transferred to senior high school, a former teacher training facility near the centre of Malatya, (101) that one can discern his first clear connections to the ultranationalist right. The MHP had seised control of that school shortly before Agca arrived, and had begun offering seminars on fascism and Turkes’ ideological principles. (102) This institution thence served as a meeting place for a local Bozkurt subgroup, which was led by Oral Celik and included within its ranks Caylan Mehmet Sener, his brother Hasan, and Yalcin Ozbey. (103) Since all of these figures later played important roles in Agca’s terrorist escapades, there can be little doubt that Agca fell in with this group at senior high school. This was confirmed later, for when Turkish police raided Agca’s family home following his arrest for the murder of Ipekci, they found photographs of Agca together with local Bozkurt and Idealist (Ulkucu) leaders, posters of Turkes, and MHP literature. (104)

However, Agca may have also become involved with local elements of Abuzer Ugurlu’s Turkish mafia at this time. Ugurlu came from the same town in Malatya province – Porturge – as the Sener brothers, (105) made use of several key customs posts infiltrated by the MHP to conduct his business, (106) and seems to have hired Celik and other Malatyali Bozkurtlar for various smuggling operations. (107) The alliance between organised crime and the extreme right conforms to a pattern common throughout the world, (108) and in Turkey it served the interests of both Igurlu, who needed political protection to cover his smuggling activities, (109) and the MHP which needed funding for both its overt and subversive political actions. (110) According to one generally unreliable source, Agca occasionally drove Ugurlu’s trucks along heroin smuggling routes while still at school at Malatya, (111) but whether or not this is true Ugurlu was at least indirectly involved in many of the later phases of Agca’s career.

In the Fall of 1976, Agca registered as a student in the University of Ankara’s History and Geography program and moved into the school’s rightist-controlled Besevler dormitory, although he may not have attended classes regularly. (112) Little is known about his extracurricular activities, including those of a political nature. (113) Henze argues, based on Agca’s own confession and Ankara police records, that he ‘avoided entanglements in agitation’, (114) whereas Feroz Ahmad suggests that he participated in political violence since he was ‘apparently was [already] an experienced hit-man’ by the time he moved to Istanbul in 1978. (115) Although this latter claim remains to be substantiated, Agca must have been engaged in some sort of illicit activities during his stay in Ankara, for on 13 December 1977 $16,000 in Turkish lira was deposited in the Beyazit (University) branch of the Turkiye Is Bankasi in Istanbul, several months before he actually arrived there, ostensibly to attend school. (116) This was the first of many deposits made in his or his mother’s name at several Turkish banks in the next few months, the source of which has yet to be clarified. (117) Agca himself claimed to have accompanied pro-communist THKO (People’s Liberation Army of Turkey) leader Reslim Tore and Sedat Sirri Kadem, a Malatya school chum and alleged DEV-SOL (Revolutionary left) militant, to train at a Palestinian guerrilla camp in Lebanon from the Spring to the Fall of 1977, (118) but there is no corroborating evidence to support this statement and many of the details seem improbable. (119)

In the Fall of 1978 Agca enrolled in the Economics program at Istanbul University, one of the country’s most prestigious academic institutions. There is some question about whether he actually took the examination that qualified him for entrance there, and he seems to have spent little time going to or studying for classes since school records indicate that he never completed those he registered for. (120) While in Istanbul he lived in a rightist youth hostel, (121) but again there is controversy over whether he involved himself in right-wing political violence. Sterling insists that he laid low and avoided such sordid activities, (122) but Ahmad says that students in the hostel where he lived remembered him as rightist militant who was allegedly seen shooting two leftists in the legs and concludes that ‘his notoriety was such that leftists tried to kill him on several occasions’. (123) Although proponents of the ‘Bulgarian connection’ imply that the many bank deposits in Agca’s name – which together totalled $15,000 – $18,000, a huge sum for a poor Turkish student – were provided by his supposed communist sponsors, (124) more compelling circumstantial evidence suggests that Agca received this money for black market (kara borsa) smuggling operations undertaken by a network of rightist Malatya comrades who had likewise moved to Istanbul. (125) Perhaps part of it also constituted an advance payment for the planned assassination of Ipekci. (126) Whatever the exact case, ‘one gets the impression that by this time Agca’s student status may have been mostly a cover for other activity which was absorbing most of this time.’ (127)

The murder of Ipecki

The 1 February 1979 murder of Ipekci was the first high-profile crime that Agca was involved in, and it soon earned him widespread notoriety within Turkey and brought him to the attention of police and security agencies in several other countries. Much still remains to be clarified about Ipekci’s murder, including the precise motive, but what can be said with certainty is that the actual perpetrators of the crime were almost all Malatyali Bozkurtlar that Agca had long been associated with. (128) First of all, the driver of the car used by the killer was Agca’s friend Caylan, a fact which the latter subsequently admitted. (129) Secondly, Agca claimed to have obtained the gun used to kill Ipekci from Mehmet Sener and – perhaps more importantly – to have returned it to him at the Aksaray district office of the MHP when the job was completed. (130) Thirdly, a mass of circumstantial evidence suggests that another rightist participated in the attack with Agca. Most informed observers believe Malatya Bozkurt leader Celik was that person, and some go so far as to claim that he was the actual triggerman, not Agca. (131) Others have implicated still another right-wing militant, Omer Ay, (132) who was head of the UTED (United Technical Workers’ Association) in Nevsehir prior to his flight and attempt to obtain political asylum in West Germany. (133) Agca later said that his old Malatya friend Ozbey actually fired the gun in the Ipekci murder even though he had personally taken the blame. (134) The important point for our purposes is not to determine who actually pulled the trigger, but to recognise that whoever did so was a right-wing militant linked to the MHP and probably a member of the Bozkurt chapter from Agca’s hometown.

The ultimate sponsors and planners of the attack have not yet been identified with certainty. In 1983, long after Agca had been pressured to implicate the Bulgarians, he identified Ugurlu as the culprit. (135) However, Mumcu presents a strong case that it was Celik who masterminded the Ipekci assassination, as well as most of Agca’s other illegal actions. (136) Celik was at that time the ‘main lieutenant’ of Abdullah Catli, who had headed the Ankara branch of the Bozkurtlar and had become the ‘second in command’ of the national UGD (Idealist Youth Association) during the 1970s as a result of his skills as an ‘enforcer’ for Turkes. (137) In my view the most logical explanation is that Ipekci was killed by these rightist militants due to MHP opposition to what he symbolised – a moderate opposed to political extremism and terrorism to the point of advocating martial law to protect the social democratic Ecevit government. (138) He was also favorably disposed towards Western civilisation and was engaged in promoting reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, both of which were anathema to the most radical segments of the ultranationalist right. (139) Perhaps this crime also served the MHP’s long-term strategy of provocation, which was designed to lead to a coup by rightist supporters within the Turkish military.

In any case, after the assassination Agca seems to have made no significant changes in either his lifestyle or his activities. During this period he may have even been involved in other political violence, and he continued to frequent various right-wing haunts in Istanbul. On 25 June 1979 he was arrested by Turkish police at one such place, a Bozkurt hangout known as the Cafe Marmara. (140) Agca immediately confessed to murdering Ipekci, and after fingering Caylan and Sener – presumably to make his story more credible, since others were known to have been involved – he began insisting that he was an independent terrorist without organisational support who was ‘not the servant of any political ideas or ideology’. (141) At his October trial, Agca further attempted to distance himself from his right-wing political associates by claiming that pro-Ecevit Turkish Interior Minister Hasan Fehmi Gunes had offered to spring him from jail if he claimed that high officials of MHP ordered him to kill Ipekci, a charge Gunes vehemently denied. (142) Nevertheless, Turkish authorities rightly concluded that Agca was a Bozkurt militant.

On September 1979, even before the trial had begun, Agca was shifted to the Kartal-Maltepe military prison, the highest security facility in the country, (143) and was placed in the maximum security section. (144) On the night of 23 November 1979, several days after proclaiming that he was innocent in the Ipekci shooting and would name the real killers at his next court appearance, he was sprung from prison with the help of several guards who were affiliated with the MHP, (145) some of whom also received bribes from Ugurlu. (146) After walking through eight checkpoints dressed in a military uniform, an ‘escape [which] would have been impossible without help from high quarters’, (147) Agca joined Celik, who Mumcu and others believe was the planner of the escape, along with Catli. (148) However, Ugurlu was also probably involved in the process, not only financially but through his Bozkurt contacts inside Kartal-Maltepe prison. (149) Agca was then safehoused in Istanbul by Catli’s Bozkurt underground for over twenty days, (150), during which time he wrote the anti-Pope letter to Milliyet and murdered two people, including lottery ticket salesman Ramazan Gunduz, who he suspected of tipping off the police as to his whereabouts. (151)

Sometime around the beginning of 1980, Celik organised Agca’s escape route across Turkey and his border crossing into Iran, which occurred on 1 February. (152) There are contradictory reports about Agca’s exact itinerary, (153) but the feature that stands out in each of them is that all of the people involved in aiding him were Idealists. Thus, e.g., Celik seems to have accompanied him, (154) Mehmet Sener’s brother Hasan drove him from Istanbul to Ankara, (155) several other rightists provided him with temporary shelter or assistance (including Mustafa Dikici, Mehmet Kursun, Hasan Murat Pala, and Hamit Gokenc, who gave Agca a passport), (156) UGD leader Muhsin Yazicioglu helped arrange for him to get his passport, (157) and rightist militant Timur Selcuk received payment from Mehment Sandir, an MHP member, Hergun journalist, and partner in the Tumpas trading firm – along with the leader of the ADUTDF (European Federation of Democratic Turkish Idealist Clubs), Musa Serdar Celebi – to smuggle him across the border to Erzurum. (158) Meanwhile Catli, from his new base of operations in Varna, instructed Omer Ay to procure another passport for Agca to use in the future. (159) Ay borrowed two ID’s collected by Ibrahim Kurt (a former head of the Nevsehir UGD), substituted other photos on them (including one of Erkan Ender, a former Idealist policeman), (160) and used them to obtain two ‘perfectly forged’ passports from a passport office where the security director was a religious rightist named Haydar Tek. (161) The one for Agca was in the name of Faruk Ozgun, and it was later delivered to him in Bulgaria.

In any case, no one knows why Agca crossed the border into Iran or what he did between February and July of 1980, when he appeared in Sofia. Western propagandists like Henze argue that he secretly met with Turkish leftist leader Tore and perhaps entered the Soviet Union to undergo training at a KGB camp; (162) whereas some East bloc propagandists claim that he joined up with CIA-backed supporters of the recently-deposed Shah and played some role in the US attempt to rescue the Americans held hostage by Iranian militants in Teheran! (163) In fact, there is absolutely no evidence to support either contention, and I suspect the main reason for smuggling Agca into Iran was simply to throw the Turkish authorities off his trail.

Agca next appeared in Sofia. In the second week of July 1980, he had a meeting in the deluxe Vitosha Hotel with an Ugurlu underling, Omer Mersan, who paid him $800 and apparently made arrangements with Catli to secure the false Ozgun passport for him. (164) Mersan was not a committed rightist, (165) but rather an underworld operator whose Munich-based Vardar Company served as a conduit for drugs and arms trafficking by the Ugurlu family. (166) This trafficking involved the extensive use of MHP-affiliated organisations and personnel in Western Europe, who received safehousing, weapons, and large influxes of cash in return for their participation. (167) It also depended upon the cooperation of the Bulgarian authorities, who obtained hard currency and intelligence information in exchange for allowing Bulgaria to be used as staging area for smuggling operations. (168) Eventually, Agca also claimed to have met with a mysterious Bulgarian named ‘Mustafaeff’, (169) with Celik, with Ugurlu’s subordinate partner Bekir Celenk, and with another Bulgarian named ‘Kolev’, i.e. Tudor Aivazov, one of the three later charged in Italy for their alleged role in the papal plot. (170) But aside from Agca’s unreliable and manipulative testimony, information about his activities in Bulgaria is practically nonexistent.

The situation becomes somewhat clearer after Agca left Bulgaria on 31 August 1980. Although his precise movements are obscure at times, it is certain that he spent the next several months travelling throughout Western Europe, although he did make short jaunts to Tunisia and Majorca during this period. There is unanimous agreement that he did so with the help of a number of Turkish rightists who were affiliated with branches of the MHP’s external support organisation, (171) and even Henze admits that ‘a case could be made that Agca had been sheltered and prepared for action against the Pope inside a Grey Wolf network in Germany’. (172) Among the people involved were his old Malatyali comrades Celik, Ozbey, and Sener, some of whom had fled Turkey along with thousands of other ultra-rightists after the military coup on 12 September 1980, when the new junta began to make mass arrests of MHP members and Bozkurtlar, including Turkes and other party leaders. (173) But the most important assistance of all was provided by ADUTDF chief Musa Serdar Celebi, the second most powerful Idealist in Europe after Turkes’ friend and MHP ideologue Enver Altalyi.

ADUTDF

The ADUTDF was originally established in 1978, ostensibly as a ‘coordinating body for cultural, religious, and welfare organisations set up by Turks in Germany’, (174) but beneath this benign exterior it actually represented nothing more than the reorganisation of the MHP’s overseas branches that had been banned by the Turkish government in 1976. (175) Indeed, this ‘cultural’ organisation performed the very same functions as the old one had – recruiting Turkish gastarbeiter (‘guest workers’) into the MHP, indoctrinating them in Turkes fascist-inspired ideology, and helping to finance MHP and Bozkurt subversion inside Turkey, in part with the profits derived from arms and drug trafficking. (176) By the time of the 1980 coup, the ADUTDF claimed to have 50,000 members organised into 129 branches, 87 of which were in West Germany, and German police estimated that at least 26,000 Turkish workers were members of neo-fascist groups. (177) Nor were these organisations reluctant to use violence. There are a number of examples of rightist assaults on Turkish workers and left-wing activists in Germany and elsewhere, some of which resulted in deaths. (178) Agca himself may have committed two murders in return for ADUTDF logistical support. (179)

As evidence of Agca’s links to these overseas MHP affiliates, it should be noted that he contacted Celebi himself on several occasions. He called him from Bulgaria in the summer of 1980 and again from Majorca in late April 1981, in the latter case exclaiming ‘I have received the money…[and] will now go to Rome and finish the job’. (180) Equally important, he met Celebi twice, once in Milan on 15 December 1980 to talk things over and obtain $500 from him; the second time in Zurich on 3 March 1981, when Celenk reportedly paid out $1.5 million to be divided three ways between Celebi, Celenk, and Agca. (181) Celebi’s innocent version of these events has not held up under serious scrutiny, and it can therefore be said that he was the highest-ranking member of the Turkish far-right to be unequivocally linked to the papal assassination plot.

Other connections between Agca and this European-based right-wing milieu have also been discovered. First of all, Celik purchased the 9 mm Browning pistol used to shoot the Pope from an Austrian gunrunner with Nazi sympathies, Horst Grillmayer, and then passed in on to a Bozkurt leader in Olten, Switzerland, named Omer Bagci, for safekeeping. (182) Agca later called Bagci from Majorca and arranged to meet him in Milan on 9 May 1981, where the gun was finally transferred. (183) Furthermore, he made a 20 minute call from Rome on 13 April 1981 to Hasan Taskin, ‘one of the top ten Grey Wolves’ in West Germany. Taskin implausibly claimed under interrogation that it must have been a wrong number, and German police were content not to press the issue! (184)

Agca had two accomplices

At long last we have arrived at St Peter’s Square on the fateful day, and here too other members of the Turkish extreme right made their appearance. It is now known that Agca had two accomplices with him on that occasion. In October of 1982, he tried to mislead Italian investigators by claiming that the Bulgarian ‘Kolev’ (Aivazov) was the man photographed while running away across the square after the shooting, but shortly after admitted that it was actually his close friend Celik. (185) The other accomplice is thought to have been Omer Ay, the Neveshir Idealist who had earlier helped Agca obtain the Ozgun passport, although this is not certain. (186)

There is also an interesting postscript to the crime that may be of importance to our topic. A letter postmarked Munich and dated 20 July 1981 that was purportedly written by Agca to Turkes was sent anonymously to Milliyet. The letter read:(187)

Illustrious Leader (Sayin Basbugum),

First I kiss your hands with my deep respects, and I want to express my debt of infinite thanks for your paternal interest. I am in no difficulties, with the help of all kinds from my brother Idealists who have taken me into their hearts. I find myself in the happy condition of doing my duty with honour, with the pride of being a Turk…the duty of grand Ideals. May God (Tanri) protect the Turks and make them Great.’ (188)

The circumstances under which this letter was found were highly suspicious, as was its method of arrival at the Milliyet offices, both of which lend credence to the belief of Henze and Sterling that it was a clumsy forgery. (189) However, others have argued that the letter was subjected to a battery of tests by the Turkish authorities that confirmed its authenticity, and it was thence officially accepted as evidence by the Ankara military court presiding over the huge MHP-Turkes trial. (190) If it is in fact genuine, the case for an indigenous Turkish plot to kill the Pope would be further strengthened. In short, there is no doubt that Agca’s links to the Turkish ultranationalist right dated back to this high school days in Malatya and continued uninterrupted right up until the moment that he wounded Pope John Paul II. (191) However this seemingly straightforward picture has been complicated by Agca’s claims to have had links to the PLO and the Bulgarian secret police, which have allowed Western propagandists to insist that the rightist Turkish networks involved were either covertly controlled or cleverly manipulated by the Bulgarians, with the help of Turkish mafiosi who had been recruited, co-opted, or coerced into participating. Although it must be admitted this is a possibility, too many unresolved evidentiary and logical problems remain to justify accepting such a thesis without further investigation.

‘well-constructed, fantastic and incredible stories’

First and foremost, Agca’s testimony cannot be accepted at face value. It has already been pointed out that he repeatedly lied and altered his testimony, (192) and even Judge Ilario Martella, the Italian magistrate who single-mindedly pursued a ‘Bulgarian connection’ which he had already accepted as fact, (193) acknowledged Agca’s ‘devilish ability, displayed many times, to produce well-constructed, fantastic and incredible stories’. (194) Yet Martella and various disinformation peddlers have nonetheless accepted his statements as accurate whenever it suited their purposes, (195) despite the fact that Agca had clear motives for implicating the left in his crime. For one thing, as a confirmed Turkish ultranationalist he would have been virulently hostile to both Soviet Russia and the left-wing opposition in general, whether domestic or foreign. (196) For another, as a prisoner facing a life term or death, he would have been motivated to tell the Italian authorities what he thought they wanted to hear – or confirm what they were pressuring him to say – in order to obtain a more lenient sentence. (197) The adoption of such a strategem also served to protect his probably rightist sponsors and known accomplices, including his friends Oral Celik and Yalcin Ozbey. (198) Given Agca’s actual record of telling outright lies and his obvious political and personal motives for promoting – however belatedly – a ‘Bulgarian connection’, Mumcu and others are right to insist that nothing he says should be believed in the absence of independent confirmation. (199) Is there any such confirmation of his claims to have been trained in a Palestinian guerrilla camp or directed by Bulgarian secret agents?

According to Agca’s testimony, in 1977 he accompanied Tore and Sirri Kadem to a Palestinian camp south of Beirut, where he received 40 days training in guerrilla tactics. While there, he supposedly encountered other Turks from the ‘most disparate of Turkey’s subversive groups’ and, upon his return to Turkey, ‘established clandestine relations with six underground organisations’, four on the radical left and two on the radical right. (200) Unfortunately there is not even a shred of evidence to support Agca’s contention, (201) nor is it plausible. Although it is certain that factions of the PLO trained Turkish left-wing guerrillas (202) and that they also periodically trained European neo-Nazis, (203) it is rather difficult to believe that Turkish leftists, ultranationalists, religious rightists, Kurdish separatists, and anti-Turkish Armenian terrorists were all being trained simultaneously in the same camp or that they were subsequently colluding with one another on a regular basis. (204) This type of joint anti-government collaboration between the Turkish ultra-right and extreme left might well have developed after the military’s 1980 crackdown on (and betrayal of) the MHP, but it would have been much less likely beforehand – unless it involved provocations – since the MHP was at that time working in conjunction with rightists factions of the armed forces and the MIT to crush the left and provoke an authoritarian right-wing coup. (205) It is much more probable that Turkish rightists were trained in paramilitary camps set up by the right-wing Lebanese Phalange. (206) In any event, there is no independent confirmation of Agca’s claims to have been trained by Palestinians.

KINTEX

The situation regarding Agca’s Bulgarian links is more complicated. Although again there is no outside evidence to corroborate Agca’s claims to have had meetings with various Bulgarian officials, either in Bulgaria or in Italy, Agca did spend time in Bulgaria and periodically received financial and logistical help from Turkish mobster Abnuzer Ugurlu, who directed smuggling operations out of Sofia. But it is precisely the nature of the relationship between Ugurlu and the Bulgarian authorities, as well as the reasons for the former’s provision of aid to the latter, that constitute the major bones of contention. There is no doubt that elements of the Bulgarian government had established a direct working relationship with Ugurlu’s mob. This was done through KINTEX, the official state import-export agency. Apparently, KINTEX was originally founded in 1968 following the merger of three smaller commercial import-export firms, (207) and it has since overseen ‘the international trade of such legitimate commodities as arms, textiles, appliances and cigarettes’. (208) Moreover, despite the predictable East Bloc denials and the doubts expressed by Herman and Brodhead, (209) I believe there is sufficient reliable evidence to indicate that KINTEX has also participated in the illicit trafficking of narcotics and weapons from and through Bulgarian territory, in conjunction with other state agencies that serve as distribution outlets. (210) To facilitate these activities, ‘Bulgarian officials, through KINTEX, designate [non-Bulgarian] ‘representatives’ to operate as brokers who [then] establish exclusive arrangements with smugglers for bartered contraband.’ (211) ‘Among the more notable traffickers linked to KINTEX are Turkish nationals Abuzer Ugurlu, Bekir Celenk, and Mustafa Kisacik, members of the ‘Turkish Mafia’ ‘. (212) This same Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report goes on to say that some of these Turkish traffickers and representatives of KINTEX ‘have also been named as associates of members of the right-wing Baskurtlar (sic)…in Istanbul and Frankfurt, West Germany. ‘(213) Since some sources have claimed that ‘top ranking members of the Bulgarian intelligence service (DS)’ serve as the directors of KINTEX, (214) one may well wonder just what Ugurlu’s motives were in dealing with Agca.

One interpretation has been offered by hardliners like Henze and Nathan M. Adams, Senior Editor of Reader’s Digest, a popular international magazine with a long history of apparent participation in CIA disinformation campaigns. (215) In their conspiratorial reconstruction, there is a clear chain of command linking the alleged puppeteers of the Soviet KGB to their DS lackies at KINTEX, then to KINTEX- linked smugglers and possible DS agents Ugurlu and Celenk, and finally to right-wing dupe Agca. This argument begins with the idea that the Bulgarian regime is the most subservient of all the regimes established by the Soviets in Eastern Europe, which is probably true. But Henze goes so far as to claim that ‘nothing Bulgaria does can be regarded separately from the larger framework of pernicious and destructive Soviet operations directed against the Free World’, and that ‘there is no aspect of Soviet- sponsored subversion in which the communist government of Bulgaria has not taken part – and continues to take part’. (216) Based on this a priori assumption, he and Adams enthusiastically accept the problematic testimony of Stefan Sverdlov, a colonel in the Bulgarian DS prior to his defection to the West in 1971, who claims that the head of the Warsaw Pact security services met in Moscow in 1967 to plan actions to ‘exploit and hasten the inherent ‘corruption’ of Western society.’ (217) As a result, the DS supposedly issued a directive on 16 July 1970 (#M-120/00-0500) which promoted ‘the destabilisation of Western society through, among other tools, the narcotics trade.’ (218) Acting through the newly-formed KINTEX, the DS has since then engaged in the systematic trading of Middle Eastern drugs for European guns, which have then been supplied to ‘terrorist’ groups to further Soviet destabilisation efforts in Turkey and elsewhere. (219) To accomplish this they made use of selected non-Bulgarian smugglers, especially Turks, as intermediaries. Some of these latter were purportedly also recruited as DS agents, including Ugurlu himself, who according to various anonymous or unreliable sources had served in such a capacity for many years prior to Agca’s assassination attempt. (220) If all of the above is accepted without reservations, a circumstantial case can be made that Ugurlu recruited Agca to kill the Pope and provided him with assistance at the behest of his DS and Soviet handlers.

However, there are innumerable problems with this scenario, which, when evaluated together, suggest a far more plausible alternative. In the first place, although ‘the rulers of communist Bulgaria are extremely loyal allies of the Soviet Union….even Bulgarian communists are not immune from the strain of nationalism’ and the Bulgarian people ‘are much less attached to the Russians than many outsiders think’. (221) Moreover, not all illicit activities occurring in Bulgaria are under government control, nor can they be ascribed to government policy. (222) According to Jack R. Perry, former US ambassador to Bulgaria, ‘the impression was inescapable to those living in Sofia that Bulgaria was like a Mafia operation on a grand scale.’ (223) Graft was widespread, and some of the smuggling attributed to the Bulgarian state may have been carried out by corrupt ‘individuals – often with friends and relatives in the highest places – who were out to make money’ for themselves. (224) This does not absolve the Bulgarian regime from its documented participation in international arms and drug smuggling, but it does suggest that some of this smuggling has been organised for private gain rather than in accordance with public policy.

Secondly, there are logical shortcomings in the theory that KINTEX smuggling was part of a master anti-Western plot. Aside from the evidentiary difficulties shortly to be discussed, KINTEX apparently arranged to sell weapons secretly to several anti-communist states and groups, including the South African government, (227) right-wing Christian Falangists in Lebanon, (228) the Nicaraguan contra forces, (229) and Turkish rightists. (230) Even if the latter can be said to support Soviet destabilisation operations merely by facilitating internal violence in Turkey, (231) sales to the other others definitely do not square with East Bloc political interests. This suggests that a primary motivation for Bulgarian participation in illegal trafficking in guns and drugs is economic, not political. Indeed, several of the representatives from US agencies called upon to testify on this subject before Congressional committees have listed Bulgarian objectives as (a) the acquisition of hard Western currency, which is in short supply in that country; (b) the supplying of various left-wing insurgent groups with arms, ‘in support of communist revolutionary aims’; and (c) the gathering of intelligence from international smuggling networks that are allowed to operate in or through Bulgarian territory. (232) In short, the DS have become involved in the trafficking of arms and drugs for the very same reasons as many Western intelligence agencies, viz., to obtain untraceable currency that can be used to fund secret operations, to help arm governments or insurgent groups supporting their own political aims, and to acquire useful intelligence information from widely travelled and well-connected smugglers. (233)

Thirdly, there are serious problems with some of the sources supporting the claims of Henze, Sterling and Adams concerning the Bulgarians.(234) Sverdlov’s testimony about the supposed Soviet-sponsored master plan to destabilise the West is impossible to verify, as is his claim about the contents of the 1970 DS document. Aside from various inherent problems with the public testimony of defectors, which is invariably manipulated and sometimes manufactured out of whole cloth by their new handlers, in this case there is no way to examine the document in question to determine whether or not it is genuine, or even if it actually exists. (235) One is certainly entitled to be suspicious here, since on another occasion documentation about Bulgarian involvement in illicit trafficking was shown to be forged. (236) It is therefore not surprising that the US government agencies concerned with this issue have admitted that they have ‘no information by which to corroborate the existence of Warsaw Pact meetings with destabilisation directives’, or to the purported DS documents. (237) According to the testimony of R. M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, many of the allegations about the Bulgarian use of the drug trade to finance terrorism and undermine the West ‘came from confidential sources, and have understandably proved difficult to substantiate.’ (238) The same is true of the allegations that Ugurlu and Celenk had been recruited into the DS, as indicated above, although these latter allegations seem quite plausible to me.

In sum, the conspiratorial scenario can only remain a hypothesis – and not a very convincing one – in the absence of evidence that is more substantial than that so far provided. It is one thing to acknowledge that the Bulgarian regime and Turkish smugglers had entered into a mutually beneficial economic arrangement, which is supported by a good deal of evidence from diverse sources, and altogether something else to assert that this constitutes proof that the DS, acting on behalf of the KGB, controlled the far-flung activities of the Sofia-based Turkish mafia. (239) Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the virulently anti-communist and anti-Soviet Turkish right would enter into anything more than a temporary marriage of convenience with one of the Soviet Union’s closest allies. And to suggest, as Henze does, that Celebi’s huge ADUTDF organisation had fallen under the control of the Bulgarian secret police is implausible. (240)

Using similar kinds of arguments, one could make an even stronger case for Western sponsorship of the papal plot. There are a number of suggestive bits of information, including the testimony of MIT informant and agent provocateur Hoca Kocigit to the effect that the MIT had paid Agca both to implicate his (rightist) accomplices in the Ipekci murder and promised to organise his escape if he was arrested. (241) Even Sterling has raised the question of whether Agca was manipulated by a faction within the MIT, (242) and Mumcu has argued that Ugurlu also had links with that agency. (243) Then there is the much commented upon inaction of West German authorities in response to Turkish government appeals to search for and arrest Agca, (244) as well as their extraordinarily inept questioning of Turkish rightists and others involved in some way with Agca, including Sener, Mersan, Celebi, the Taskin brothers, and Catli. (245) It also turned out that Grillmayer had a BND ‘control’ officer named Paul Saalbach, as Austrian police discovered to their dismay after arresting him in 1983 trying to smuggle a huge truckload of automatic weapons across their border from Bulgaria. (246) There is also a clear BND link to Turkes lieutenant Altalyi, who listed his BND contacts (including a former Azeri SS officer) in a letter he wrote to the MHP basbug. (247) Finally, there are numerous connections between the CIA and MHP, both in Turkey and Europe. It seems clear that the CIA and US military intelligence made use of civilian Idealists by recruiting them into the Kontr-Gerilla organisation, (248) and former Turkoman SS man Ruzi Nazar has been identified by several investigators as the liaison between CIA personnel, including Henze himself, and the MHP leadership in West Germany. (249) And so it goes.

However, there is another interpretation of the Bulgarian-Ugurlu-Agca relationship that is entirely consistent with the verifiable facts and doesn’t require any jumps in logic or arguments based solely on guilt by association. Although acknowledging that the Bulgarian authorities have ‘established a policy of encouraging and facilitating’ the smuggling of narcotics, (250) as well as weapons, and that they ‘tolerate if not shield’ certain Turkish drug dealers, (251) this interpretation is not based on the unsubstantiated and implausible claim that the Bulgarians planned and controlled everything the smugglers and their associates did. (252) The fact that Ugurlu and Celenk made use of Bozkurt members as transporters and handlers in their smuggling infrastructure proves nothing about Bozkurt relations with the Bulgarian government, and indeed John C. Lawn, the aforementioned DEA official, reports that ‘no direct association between KINTEX and the…’Grey Wolves’ has been established, according to our information.’ (253) And although Henze and Sterling imply that the MHP acted as a ‘simple instrument of the Turkish mafia’, (254) the relationship between the two groups was far more complex than they indicate. If anything, the MHP seems to have been the dominant partner. In the opinion of Orsan Oymen, the leading journalist specialist on the Agca case in Turkey, ‘it was the Grey Wolves who were in a position to ask favours from the Mafia’ due to their political influence and control over the Turkish customs ministry, especially prior to the 1980 military coup. (255) Establishing good relations with the MHP and its affiliates was thus necessary if Ugurlu wished to engage in large-scale smuggling across the Turkish border. (256) For its part, the MHP depended upon Ugurlu’s smuggling networks to facilitate its extensive drugs-for-guns trafficking in Western Europe, (257) and also to help wanted Bozkurt terrorists elude Turkish justice and eventually reach ‘safe houses’ established by the ADUTDF in West Germany and elsewhere. Agca himself obviously made use of these networks to escape from the Turkish authorities. The only question is whether he subsequently shot the Pope on his own initiative or on the orders of his MHP superiors. Since the former view would make it difficult to explain why he was assisted in his personal vendetta by Celik and Ay, I am inclined to believe that MHP sponsored the attack. The scenario would not only account for the extensive logistical support Agca received from both Sofia-based Turkish mobsters and high-ranking MHP officials in Europe, but also would be consonant with the MHP’s – and by extension, Agca’s – anti-Western and anti-Christian ideology………….

Conclusions

I make no claim to have conclusively demonstrated that the paramilitary organisations affiliated with the MHP were behind the attempted assassination of John Paul II. It is presently impossible to gain access to the files of various Western and Eastern security and intelligence agencies, which alone might enable a historian to fully reconstruct the crime, and indeed it is doubtful if this will ever be possible. Moreover, I personally lacked sufficient time, financial resources, and political connections to be able to acquire some of the public documentation accumulated by the Italian and Turkish authorities or leaked to intelligence-linked journalists like Claire Sterling. In the absence of this primary source material, it would be foolish to come to any definitive conclusions. However, even on the basis of the meagre primary and extensive secondary sources that already exist, it can be shown that neither of the conspiratorial theses that have received wide exposure within their respective spheres can stand up under close scrutiny. Both the ‘KGB plot’ and the ‘CIA plot’ theories rest upon suspect sources, circumstantial evidence, and strained logic. The bulk of the evidence currently available points to an indigenous Turkish plot launched by the ultranationalist right. Agca undoubtedly operated within this milieu for several years, and until someone demonstrates otherwise it must be assumed that he was what he appeared to be – a neo-fascist extremist.

Notes

1. Thus, e.g., I have eschewed a detailed consideration of Agca’s personality profile and a thorough analysis of Agca’s possible external sponsors, although both subjects will certainly be touched upon below.
2. Although I am focussing on Agca’s connections to the Turkish right, which are both long-term and extensive, I am not a priori rejecting the possibility that he had connections with the left in Turkey, and perhaps also elsewhere. See note 7.
3. The exceptions are Ugur Mumcu, Orsan Oymen and Paul Henze, although the latter purposely distorts the Turkish background in order to mislead the unsophisticated reader into accepting his thesis of Soviet culpability.
4. A good example is provided by the recent book by Michael Parenti. Despite his blatant pro-Soviet biases and uncritical repetition of certain arguments about the papal plot, some of which parallel those found in East Bloc sources (see pp.130-47, 161-6), it is unclear whether Parenti is a willing propagandist or simply a naive left-wing idealist. Another example is the work by rightist author Francisco Chao Hermida, which – knowingly or not – disseminates various Western intelligence disinformation themes (including the Sterling-Henze thesis on the papal plot) to Venezuelan and other South American readers.
5. Disinformation is false, distorted or otherwise misleading information that is consciously generated and disseminated in order to manipulate the perceptions and which is the product of honest error.) Cf the CIA’s own definition, cited in Shultz and Godson p. 37. See also the useful description by Czech defector Ladislas Bittman (1985) pp.48-55. ‘Psychological operations’ is a more general term for influence operations in support of larger politico-military campaigns and objectives. See, e.g. Alfred H. Paddock Jnr in Gordon ed. p.145. Cf. the definition of psychological warfare offered by Paul M.A. Linebarger, the former trainer of CIA psywar specialists, p. 40. French guerre revolutionnaire counterinsurgency theorists have usefully subdivided such operations into guerre psychologique (operations directed against the enemy’s army and population) and action psychologique (operations directed at one’s own public). See Paret pp.56-7. For more thorough information, see Maurice Megret. The chief defect of most of these works is the authors’ insistence that such techniques are more sophisticated and extensive in totalitarian regimes than in Western ‘democracies’, a highly debatable contention. The chief qualitative difference is that in the former the disseminating agencies are more centralised and operate in the absence of internal competition, which in certain ways works against their effectiveness, since in totalistic systems the targeted audience is usually painfully aware that it is being exposed exclusively to the official ‘line’. In polycentric or ‘pluralist’ systems, it is normally much harder for the public to detect covert government-sponsored disinformation and propaganda, which heightens their impact. Cf Schiller p. 11.
6. For more on Western disinformation themes and sources on the subject of terrorism see Paull (1982) and Herman (1982).
7. Henze, author of The Plot to Kill the Pope and numerous articles as well as serving as an ‘expert’ consultant for various TV shows on the Papal plot, is a ‘former’ CIA official with extensive operational experience in Turkey, first as a case officer in 1957-8, then as Chief of Station (COS) in Ankara from 1973-77. See Ellen Ray et al eds (1979) pp.382-3, Mumcu (1984) pp.24-5 and passim; Herman and Brodhead especially pp.146-8, 157-9. For confirmation of his function as COS, see Taubman and Gelb, p. A12. Perhaps more importantly, inside Turkey he is widely suspected of having been the covert orchestrater of various terrorist and pro-coup actions undertaken by the so-called Kontr-Gerilla (KG=Counter Guerrilla) organization attached to the OHD, Special Warfare Department of the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces. See, e.g. ‘Dietro tutti i golpe’ in Panorama (Milan) 26 May 1985 p.107, though I have seen no actual evidence of this. Even so, the nature of the tasks generally performed by COS’s should at least make one highly sceptical of Henze’s trustworthiness in connection with the subject of terrorism in Turkey. For more on the KGB, see infra and note 248.
8. Sterling is the author of The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation (1985) and several articles, as well as being – like Henze – a consultant for various TV documentaries. While it would be rash to claim uniquivocally that she is a U.S. intelligence asset, her background strongly suggests that possibility. In the first place, she contributed for many years to a conservative Italian publication that was in part covertly funded by the CIA – the English-language Rome Daily American. For this CIA funding, see Crewdson and Treaster p. 37, and Preston and Ray, (1983) pp.7-8. Subsequently Sterling wrote articles for Milan’s Il Giornale Nuovo, another conservative paper that some people also claim had CIA links or, at least, consistently disseminates CIA disinformation themes. See Fred Landis, 1980 p. 43. Much more significantly, conservative Italian criminologist Franco Ferracuti, testifying before the Italian parliamentary commission investigating the secret ultra-right Masonic lodge P2, said that Michael Ledeen – himself a right-wing propagandist and occasional operative for US, Italian and possibly Israeli intelligence – has told him that in the late 1970s that Sterling was a ‘courier’ between the Italian internal security agency (SISDE) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a rightist think tank formerly affiliated with Georgetown University that employs ‘former’ CIA and military intelligence officers and consistently disseminates Western disinformation themes. See Calderoni 1986 p. 23. For a good introduction to CSIS see Fred Landis, (1979) pp.7-9. Note also that Sterling was the popularizer of the ‘Soviet terror network’ thesis in her sensationalistic work, The Terror Network:the Secret War of International Terrorism (1981), which had a considerable impact on public perceptions of terrorism in spite of its systematic distortions, weak logic, and numerous factual errors. This book also provided a pseudo-scholarly justification for the new ‘anti-terrorism’ propaganda offensive and policy initiated by the Reagan administration, which replaced the Carter administration’s earlier emphasis on ‘human rights’. In any event, even if Sterling is not herself a paid intelligence asset, she is – as her own works reveal – a propagandist who relies heavily and uncritically on information supplied to her by confidential Western intelligence sources. See O’Brien pp. 29-30. James Adams (1986) p. 3 recounts a possibly apocryphal story that a DDI of the CIA claimed that Sterling’s book was ‘largely a product of the CIA’s disinformation department’.
9. Slugenov is a right-wing Vatican priest who published his first full-length book on the papal assassination attempt in 1982. In that work, he partly based his conspiratorial argument that the KGB trained Agca and ordered the Papal shooting on an Italian military intelligence (SISMI) document dated 19 May 1981, which seems to have been a forgery since it was rejected as evidence by conservative Italian judge Ilario Martella at Agca’s trial. See Herman and Brodhead p. 98 (including note 104) and p.102, note 2. Slugenov is in all probability linked to either the conservative Ratzinger faction or the ultra-rightist integralist faction within the Vatican. Note also that elements of SISMI and its organizational predecessors have often been involved in rightist coup plots and neo-fascist terrorist incidents, and can scarcely be viewed as an unbiased source of information even under the best of circumstances. For these subversive activities, see Flamini (1981-5) and De Lutiis (1984). The latter work is published by the official publishing house of the Partito Communista Italiano (PCI), but it is a well-researched work based almost entirely on information derived either from the mainstream Italian media or the reports and documents made public in the course of several parliamentary and judicial investigations into Italian secret service ‘deviations’.
10. Bensi is the author of La Pista Sovietica:Terrorismo, Violenza, Guerra e Propaganda nella
    Teoria e nella Prassi di Mosca (Milan, Sugar,1983). Although he actively promotes the thesis that the Soviets were behind the papal shooting, the book is valuable in that the author provides extensive translated selections from the official East Bloc press which clearly demonstrates the manipulative and hypocritical character of pro-Soviet accounts of both the Pope’s character and the assassination attempt.
11. De Marenches is the former head of the French foreign intelligence service, at that time known as SDECE. He is not only a rightist and a devout Catholic, but also an extremely pro-American intelligence officer who was appointed Directeur General in 1970 by Georges Pompidou and thence went on to purge some anti-American Gaullist elements with SDECE so as to ‘reconcile’ relations between that agency and the CIA. See especially Faligot and Krop pp.310-17, and Backmann in Agee and Wolf (1978) pp. 180-2. His views on the papal assassination attempt can be found in a recent book containing a series of interviews with him conducted by Christine Ockrent (1986), excerpted by Yves Cuau in ‘Services Secrets: Revelations Explosives’, in L’Express (5 September 1986) pp. 21- 2. Therein he claims to have received ‘credible’ evidence from unknown sources that there was going to be a Soviet Bloc attempt on the Pope’s life, which caused him to send two trusted lieutenants to Italy to warn the Pope in January 1980, after making contact with the Vatican through an ‘important French ecclesiastic’. But John Paul II responded that his fate was in the hand of God and de Marenches claims that no further actions were taken by the French secret service regarding this matter. (However, according to the 18 December 1982 edition of Le Quotidian de Paris, the date of de Marenches warning was actually 20 April 1981, less than one month before Agca shot the Pope! See Sterling 1985, p. 265 note 8. In any event, it should be pointed that de Marenches was also a friend of Francesco Pazienza, who was a member of the conspiratorial right-wing Super-S faction within SISMI and a collaborator of Ledeen’s. As Herman and Brodhead rightly point out (pp. 118-9, note 41), de Marenches ‘was himself an important disinformationist and recycler of the disinformation of other intelligence agencies’. Note, e.g. the ‘cooked’ intelligence report he provided to another right-wing disinformationist with intelligence connections, Arnaud de Borchgrave – currently editor of Sun-Myung Moon’s Washington Times – about a supposed Soviet plan to ‘undermine the structures of the Western world’ through terrorism that was launched at the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in 1968. See de Borchgrave (1982) pp. 5-16. This journal is published by a Unification Church front group.
12. Ledeen began his public career as a historian of Italian fascism, but after working in Italy for several years he became involved in a number of apparent intelligence-connected ventures, including Il Giornale Nuovo, CSIS, and an international group organised to ‘study’ terrorism in Italy. Later he was recruited as agent Z-3 by SISMI (in which capacity he became involved in a number of scandals), became the ‘international terrorism’ expert attached to Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s staff, and may have covertly worked with Israeli intelligence. More recently, in addition to promoting disinformation themes in a variety of conservative or rightist publications, including Commentary and Human Events, he served as an intermediary between the US National Security Council and ex-SAVAK (Iranian secret police) officer Manukher Ghorbanifar during the early phases of the illegal Iran-Contra operation. For more details see Herman and Brodhead pp. 94-9, 159-62 etc; Fred Landis (1987) pp. 68-70; Marshall et al pp. 41-2, 71-3, 174-81; US Government (1987), pp.108-111; Diana Johnstone (1982) pp. 4-5.
13. Cline was a career CIA officer who worked for many years in the clandestine services. Among other things, he served as COS in Taiwan from 1958-62 (during which time he may have helped to organize and fund the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League (APACL), the forerunner of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), a far-right umbrella organization that encompasses several neo-fascist groups) and as Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) from 1962-66. Since his formal retirement from the agency, he worked in other capacities for the US government and is now on the staff of CSIS. He has also been actively involved in numerous other extreme right political ventures, including WACL and the Moon-sponsored US Global Strategy Council. For his simple-minded conspiratorial view of the papal assassination plot, see Cline, (1984) pp. 53-5. For more on Cline’s background, see his own none too revelatory book (Cline, 1982); the biographical information provided on him, in his capacity as one of the ‘chief advisors’ for a promotional book on the CIA (Quirk) p. 5; and Anderson and Anderson pp.55-6, 126, 259-60 (WACL Links).
14. Along with Ledeen, Pisano has become the American right’s expert of choice on Italian terrorism. He has produced a stream of publications on that subject which have subtly but consistently exaggerated the threat posed by leftist terrorism and systematically minimised the threat posed by rightist terrorists, See, e.g., Pisano (1979) pp. 29-118. Note that in this work he devoted 73 pages to left-wing terrorism and only 16 to right-wing terrorism, and showed a marked preference for conspiratorial scenarios explaining the former, although the evidence of rightist conspiracies is far more substantial. (Cf ibid pp.89-100 and 109-16) More recently, in addition to writing a glowing review of Sterling and Henze’s books on the alleged KGB plot to kill the Pope – in Conflict Quarterly (Winter 1985), pp.69-72 – he has uncritically or opportunistically echoed their problematic views in his newest work, Pisano (1987) pp. 128-30.
15. It is important to recognize that within most Western intelligence agencies political views run the gamut from liberal to ultra-rightist, although conservative or right-of-centre views clearly predominate, especially in the operational branches. Thus, these organizations are not political monoliths, and indeed many of the propaganda and disinformation themes under consideration here seem to be designed in part to weaken the influence and position of the more moderate factions within these agencies by pushing the political perceptions of government policy-makers to the right. For an example of the views of the intelligence community moderates on the papal plot, see the critical review of the Henze and Sterling books by ex-OSS and CIA officer William Hood in Problems of Communism (March-April 1984) pp.67-70. Their views on ‘KGB terrorism’ in general were reflected in the editorial by former CIA official Harry Rositzke in New York Times (20 July 1981) p. A17
16. These include The Anatomy of a Slander Campaign (Sofia, Sofia Press, 1983); Andronov (1983 and 1984);‘The Bulgarian Connection’: Accusation without Proofs; Verbatim Reports from the International Meeting of Journalists held in Sofia on February 7, 1985 (Sofia, Sofia Press, 1985);‘The Bulgarian Connection’: the End of a Provocation (Sofia, Sofia Press, 1983); Kovalyov and Seydkh (Moscow, 1986): Palchev (1985); and Traikov (Sofia, 1984). All of the above are official government publications, and most have been translated into several languages. Cf also the Polish work, Guz (1983).
17. See, e.g. Roulette (1984 and 1985); Calderoni and Fido; Eisenhower and Murray; and Reichel pp.63-8, as well as many articles in the left-wing press.
18. See, e.g. Ellul pp.53-61.
19. The best examples are probably the unreliable works by British authors Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983 and 1984). These two self-described ‘social historians’ lack even the most rudimentary ability to critically analyse sources – the key task of any genuine historian. The result is an unbelievably naive reliance on Western intelligence informants, who manipulate the authors mercilessly. For other examples of witless disinformation recycling, see the pseudo-scholarly articles by Melady and Kikoski (1985) pp.775-801 and Scherer (1985) pp.351-65, although the latter may not be entirely witless. It would impossible to list the innumerable journalistic commentators in mainstream newspapers that have gullibly adopted ‘the KGB plot’ thesis. For more on this see Herman and Brodhead pp.174-205 and passim.
20. See, e.g. Chapman Pincher, a right-wing British journalist with close links to British intelligence, Pincher (1985) pp.1-6, 259-60 and passim; Sejna (1982) and de Borchgrave (1986) pp.31-9, as well as the latter’s editorial, ‘Bum Tips and Spies’ in the New York Times (12 August 1981) p. A27. For a contrary view see the editorial by ex CIA officer Rositzke, ‘KGB Disinformation’, New York Times (21 July 1981) p. A15.
21. For some examples regarding the papal assassination plot, see note 17.
22. For examples, see the many studies by Noam Chomsky, including the two recent works (1986 and 1988) that focus on this type of media subservience in connection with terrorism. Cf also, Herman (1982).
23. Friedlander (1983). Although this brief study relies heavily on rightist and disinformation sources, it is clearly an honest attempt to reconstruct the crime and its conclusions are properly cautious.
24. For intelligent conservative analyses of terrorism, see the earliest publications by Paul Wilkinson; Bell; and particularly the excellent study by Wardlaw. Many of the works by Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, a former military intelligence officer and certainly a political rightist, are also very interesting and thought-provoking, e.g. Jenkins (1975).
25. This is Herman and Brodhead. For an earlier version, see the special issue of Covert Action Information Bulletin (Spring 1985). At this point a few words should be said about the value of CAIB as a source. Although one of its founders – CIA defector Philip Agee – and some of its editors have apparently exchanged information with the Cuban intelligence agency, the Direccion General de Seguridad (DGS), and should therefore be viewed with great suspicion in my view, many of the authors who regularly write articles for the magazine are very fine investigative journalists and/or scholars. Even writers who are strongly opposed to CAIB’s stated goal of exposing covert Western intelligence operations that it views as fundamentally anti-democratic admit that much of the information contained there in is reliable. See, e.g., Bittman (1985) p. 192.
26. See, e.g., several written by Diana Johnstone for In These Times, including that cited above (note 12), and those in issues 26 June – 9 July 1985, pp.12-13; 29 January – 4 February 1986, pp.11 and 22; 16- 22 April 1986, p.9, and Orsan Oymen’s seven part article in Milliyet from 18-25 November 1984.
27. Mumcu (1984). In addition to this valuable but not entirely problem-free work, Mumcu has also written three other books dealing with aspects of terrorism in Turkey, Mumcu (1980, 81 and 82).
28. Amongst Dobbs’ numerous excellent articles are ‘A Communist Pot to Kill the Pope – or a Liar’s Fantasy’ in Washington Post (18 May, 1984) pp. C1-2, and his four-part ‘Man Who Shot the Pope’ series, 14-17 October 1984.
29. The must succinct of this thesis is offered by Sterling in Netanyahu (ed), pp.103-4. Cf Henze pp.128, 161-3, 194-200, 210-216; Sablier (1983) pp.243-57. Thomas and Morgan-Witts not only indict the KGB and Bulgarians but also the Libyans, Syrians and Palestinians! See their
    Pontiff pp.17, 210-211, 292, 294, 408-11, 457-8, note 1.
30. Henze pp.214-5, 153-9; Sterling (1985) pp.115-129; Dobbs ‘A Communist Plot..’ p. C1.
31. Thus, e.g., Henze thinks it may have occurred in the Spring of 1979 (pp. 203-4), whereas Sterling suggests it was a ‘sleeper’ recruited earlier on, which would explain his alleged training in Palestinian or Syrian guerilla camps and the bank accounts opened in his name before he arrived in Istanbul in 1978 (Sterling, 1985) pp.49-50, 101-3. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) claim that Agca first made contact with the extreme left in Malatya through his schoolmate and Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left) militant Sedat Sirri Kadem. See pp. 290-1. There is no evidence to support any of these theories other than Agca’s shifting testimony.
32. Although the relations between Pope Wojtya and the Soviet authorities is certainly more complicated than Henze and Sterling portray them, I find the efforts of those who try to minimize East bloc hostility towards the Pontiff entirely unconvincing. Soviet antipathy towards John Paul II long predated the actual establishment of Solidarnosc, as their official press clearly indicates. See note 66.
33. Indeed, they argue that the Pope incurred the wrath of Western regimes by promoting disarmament, meeting with PLO representatives, criticising US foreign policy in Central America etc. See Kovalyov and Sedykh pp.19-25.
34. Herman and Brodhead pp.14-15, 210. Some scepticism regarding alleged Soviet motives is justified, but these authors carry it too far here.
35. Agca contradicted himself and/or changed testimony over 100 times, and made a number of outlandish statements, including a claim to be Jesus Christ etc. For an overview of Agca’s main contradictions and retractions, see Herman and Brodhead (1986) pp.18-41. Cf Dobbs, ‘A Communist Plot…’ p. C2, on the frequency of Agca’s lying.
36. Sterling and Thomas and Morgan-Witts rely heavily on information provided by anonymous intelligence serouces, often for their most crucial arguments, See, e.g. Sterling (1985) pp.44-5, 72-5, 90-6; Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p. 449 note 19, p. 452 note 5, pp.453-4 note 5; idem 1984 pp. 128- 35, 277-7, 386 note 8, 405 note 25.
37. For a good discussion of some of the problems involved in defector testimony, see Herman and Brodhead pp.234-40 (Appendix C). However, I feel that they ignore one of the single most problematic factors – the absolute control exercised over defectors by their new handlers. Although most defectors from the Soviet Bloc have good personal and/or moral reasons for their antipathy to communism and probably need little prompting to implicate their former masters in the most sordid deeds, it is important to emphasize that from the moment a defector makes contact with an enemy intelligence officer – assuming he is not a ‘dangle’ or a ‘double’ – he loses most of his independence and bargaining leverage. Later on, if he does not cooperate most fully with his debriefers and handlers, they can always threaten to return him to his country of origin or embassy and to publicize his treachery, which would have horrible consequences for him and his family. In other words, even if a defector was unwilling to lie or disseminate disinformation about his former country’s activities, which is probably a rare circumstance, he would not have any real choice in the matter. This is a factor which must always be weighed when attempting to evaluate the reliability of defector testimony, and one that often tends to offset the benefits deriving from the fact that they may well have detailed first-hand knowledge of communist intelligence techniques and operations.
38. Thus, e.g., the work of Henze is filled with politically-motivated speculations and hypotheses. Practically every paragraph contains verbs in the subjunctive or conditional tenses, innuendoes followed by question marks, or – worst of all – baseless presumptions stated as if they had already been proven. See, e.g. pp.135 (second paragraph), 137 (third paragraph), 161-2 (third paragraph on), pp.177-80 (whole section), 194 (second paragraph), etc.
39. Cf Herman and Brodhead p.14; Dobbs ‘A Communist Plot……’ p. C2. However, I think they underestimate the propensity of regimes – especially those as paranoid as the Soviet regime – to initiate actions which end up being counterproductive to the attainment of desired goals. Hubris and shortsightedness can never be factored out of supposedly rational decision-making processes.
40. Again, however, it seems to me that the efficiency of enemy intelligence services is frequently exaggerated in public sources for propaganda effect. See, e.g. Henze p. 80, even though it undermines his own case. Just as some CIA operations have been characterised by gross incompetence, we can assume that not all Communist Bloc operations are planned intelligently and executed skilfully, and indeed there are plenty of examples of this. See Barron pp. 10-11, 99-101 etc. This book was compiled primarily from CIA materials leaked to the author.
41. Herman and Brodhead pp.15-16.
42. Hood ‘Unlikely conspiracy’ p. 68.
43. Ibid; Herman and Brodhead p.16; Palchev pp.63-65.
44. Hood p. 68
45. Ibid
46. Ibid pp.68-70; Herman and Brodhead p.17; Parenti p.162. Note that even Sterling initially casts doubts on the theory of Soviet involvement in the attack, saying that it was ‘crazy’ since ‘there would have been a better getaway plot’. See the interview with her in People, 1 June 1981 p.34
47. Kovalyov and Sedykh pp. 79-80; Antonov (1983) pp. 21-46
48. I know of no published work devoted entirely to the organization and operations of the MIT, although a number of works touch upon it in connection with the KG, One example is Genc.
49. For more on the MHP and Bozkurtlar, see infra. .
50. For more on P2 see Berger, Barbieri et al, Teodori, Piazzesi, Ramat et al, Rossi and Lombrassa, Anselmi.
51. For more on the Super SISMI see ‘[Sezione] Speciale:Servizi Segreti e Strutture Clandestine: La Riconstruzione Giudiziaria del Supersismi’, in Questione Giustizia 6:1 (1987) pp. 121-92
52. Integralists are Catholic ultra-nationalist who believe that the Church’s doctrine is eternal and unchanging, and who seek to infuse it – by force if necessary – into all facets of modern life. As such, they are opposed to the process of secularization and to all attempts to reform or adapt Church policies in accordance with changing social conditions. See, e.g., Poulat pp.46-57; Antoine pp.11-15. This view has often led to their adoption of rightist political policies and totalitarian methods, as for example in promoting coups and terrorism during the late 1950s and 60’s. See, e.g. Maitres pp.106-17.
53. An excellent general introduction to the BND (and other West German intelligence agencies) is provided by Walde pp.79-105.
54. The best sketch of Mossad’s structure and functioning is probably the CIA’s own leaked 1979 analysis, Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services in Counterspy (May-June 1982) pp.34-54. Most of the other works on the Israeli intelligence services are ‘hagiographic’.
55. The NATO secret service is so secret that even its name is not known, but some of its purported operations in the Italian sphere are sketched by Flamini.
56. Thus, e.g. Kovsalyov and Sedykh argue (pp. 28-30) that Mossad may have been behind the papal attack since (a) John Paul II had recently angered the Israeli government by meeting with PLO representatives, and (b) it served Israeli interests to heighten US-Soviet hostility. Strangely enough, an Austrian Security Service file leaked to Thomas and Morgan-Witts also implicated Mossad in Agca’s mistakes. See Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p. 454 note 4.
57. Andronov (1983) pp.9, 45-6; Palchev pp.11-13; Kovalyov and Sedykh p. 80; Eisenhower and Murray pp.2-4.
58. This has been done indirectly through media assets like Henze, Sterling, Ledeen, de Borchgrave and company, as well as behind the scenes overseas.
59. For more on John Paul II’s policies, see Paul Johnson, Zizola and the highly controversial (and apparently falsified) work by Gronowicz. For his activities in Poland, see Brown (ed) and Hanson pp.197-233.
60. Herman and Brodhead pp. 241-4.
61. Like its ‘Bulgarian connection’ counterpart, it consists mainly of suppositions, hypothesised linkages and circumstantial evidence.
62. This notion of a ‘dual conspiracy’ derives from the analysis of Herman and Brodhead pp.241-4.
63. See infra.
64. Apple Jnr pp.A1, A6; Munir pA1; Ahmad p.A4.
65. Cf Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slums’, p.A20.
66. For an example of hostile Soviet attitudes to John Paul II, see 30 December 1982 TASS statement cited by Henze pp.184-5. Numerous examples are provided by Bensipp.9-26, who demonstrates how East Bloc opinions on the Pope have been cynically shifted for different audiences.
67. Sterling (1985) pp.19-19.
68. Herman and Brodhead pp.102-112; Johnstone, In These Times, 29th January-4 February 1986, pp.12, 22 and many articles in the mainstream Italian press. Obviously, Soviet bloc authors also emphasize this, e.g., Plachev pp.19-22; Antonov (1983) pp.9-10.
69. Eisenhower and Murray pp.100-1; Parenti p.162. This is a naive and historically inaccurate claim.
70. The use of covert provocations and agents provocateurs dates back to at least 19th century Europe, and was especially prevalent in Tsarist Russia. See Golstein pp.72-4. I personally believe it considerably predates that, both in Europe and elsewhere.
71. See Kitson pp.72-211
72. Laurent pp.148-56
73. Peri pp.237-8
74. See the fascinating articles by Pepe Diaz Herrero et al pp.36-40, and Miguel Angel Liso pp.40-1.
75. See Flamini passim vols 1 and 2; Bale.
76. Gonsalez-Mata pp.266-74
77. Bittman (1972) pp.1-3. The author goes on to claim that this was far from an exceptional case.
78. For an unconfirmed example, see Clissold pp.10-11. However, the source for this is none other than the infamous Czech defector and disinformation peddler, former Major-General Jan Sejna, who implausibly links a cross-border foray into Yugoslavia by emigré saboteurs to an alleged Warsaw Pact military plan (codenamed ‘Polarka’ [Pole Star]) that was designed to provide a pretext for a Soviet invasion of both Yugoslavia and the eastern half of Austria! See, e.g. Herman and Brodhead pp.135- 6, 237-8. Note also that the ISC, publisher of the Clissold piece, is a ‘think tank’ once headed by Brian Crozier, a specialist on insurgency, who has long been an asset of various Western intelligence agencies. To give only one example, he formerly played a leading role in the London- based Forum World Features ‘news service’, which was subsequently exposed in the mainstream American and British press as a propaganda agency for the CIA and MI6. For excellent summaries of the histories of Crozier and ISC, see State Research 1 (October 1977) and appendices 1 and 8 of Lobster 11. Nevertheless, many monographs in the ISC’s ‘Conflict Studies’ series are informative and reliable.
79. This doesn’t seem to discourage Henze, who argues that ‘we are past the point where it serves the interest of any party except the Soviets to adopt the minimalist, legalistic approach which argues that if there is no ‘documentary evidence’ or some other form of incontrovertible proof that the government of the USSR is behind something, we must assume that it is not.’ See ‘The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey’, in Atlantic Community Quarterly (Winter 1981-2) p. 468. Cf also Sterling (1985) p.137 who denies the need to find a ‘smoking gun’. While I agree that it is often difficult if not impossible to obtain such clear evidence of clandestine and covert operations, one surely needs more than they have provided to warrant accusing another superpower of such a serious crime.
80. Sterling (1985) p. 70
81. Henze p. 204
82. Ibid p. 135; Sterling pp.12-13, 71, 206, 246.
83. Henze p.134; Sterling pp.43-4
84. Sterling pp.50, 71, 101-2, 232. Henze also speaks of Agca’s careful preparation for interrogation, implying a Soviet connection.
85. Henzepp.198-200. His arguments here are frankly absurd.
86. Ibid pp.129-30
87. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) passim. Much of their psychological analysis is amateurish and unconvincing.
88. Henze pp.27, 131-2, 139, 150, 198-9.; Sterling (1985) pp.25, 47, 70, 75, 247.
89. Henze p.201; Sterling p.70. This is a false claim, although the evidence for Agca’s links to Turkes himself remains a matter of controversy. See further, notes 187-90.
90. Sterling (1985) p.70
91. Ibid p.102; Henze pp.152, 176, 199.
92. Herman and Brodhead pp. 55-6
93. Henze pp.27, 38-9, 136; Sterling pp.40, 45; Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p.332. This is a disputed matter.
94. Henze p.136
95. Sterling (1985) p.71
96. Sterling ibid p.40; Henze pp.31-2
97. Sterling pp.40-1; Henze pp.31-2
98. Henze p.39. Dobbs dates Agca’s association with the right from his junior high school days. See ‘Child of Turkish Slum’, p. A20.
99. Sterling (1985) p.39
100. Cf Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish slum’ p. A20. Right-and left-wing terrorists in Turkey often had similar personality types and their decision to become affiliated with one of these political extremes was frequently the result of circumstantial factors rather than firm ideological commitments. See Bale. The fact that Agca was a Sunni probably also predisposed him to become a rightist, since rival Turkish Shi’ites (Alevis) were often leftists. Cf the testimony of Caylan, cited by Henze p.39.
101. Henze p.38
102. Apple Jr p.A1
103. Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’ p. A20
104. Apple Jnr p. A1; Howe, ‘Turk’s Hometown Puzzled by His Climb to Notoriety ‘, New York Times (23 May 1981) p. 2. According to Thomas and Morgan-Witts, who seem to have acquired part of Agca’s personal library – the one Henze claimed Henze’s mother said she had burned (Henze pp.31-2) – it included Frederick Forsyth’s novel about a right-wing plot to assassinate De Gaulle, The Day of the Jackal, and they assert that Agca read it several times. See Pontiff, pp.9-10, 445.
105. Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’, p. A20
106. Ibid
107. Indeed, Celik seems to have worked for Ugurlu’s co-Godfather Bekir Celenk. See Sterling (1985) p. 92
108. See e.g., Kruger.
109. Dobbs ‘Child of a Turkish slum’ p. A20. The MHP was in a position to provide this in the mid to late 1970s by virtue of its participation in coalition governments and consequent assumption of control over the Customs Ministry. Indeed, an MHP member was appointed to head the Ministry of State Monopolies and Customs, and many other rightists were then recruited to fill lower-level customs posts. See Black Book on the Militarist ‘Democracy’ in Turkey
     (Brussels, Info-Turk, 1986) p. 331. Cf Henze p.169 reveals that ADUTDF leader Celebi had joined the Customs Ministry in 1976 and thence became involved with Bulgarian smuggling.
110. Dobbs ‘Child of Turkish Slum’ p. A20
111. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p.12
112. Henze pp. 36-7, 131; Dobbs ‘Child of Turkish slum’ p. A20; Sterling p. 45
113. According to Dobbs ibid it is not known whether Agca participated in rightist student clashes with the left.
114. Henze, p.131, Cf Sterling p.45
115. Ahmad p.A4. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) pp. 209-10 claim – as usual without providing any evidence – that Turkes was preparing him for a ‘hit’ during the time he resided in Ankara.
116. Henze p.136
117. See notes 124 and 125
118. Sterling (1985) pp.18-19; Henze pp.132-3; Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p. 288; Sablier pp.246-7.
119. See infra
120. Henze pp.133, 136; Sterling (1985) p. 45
121. Howe, ‘Turks in disagreement….’ p. A4
122. Sterling (1985) p. 45: Cf Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p. 332
123. Ahmad p. A4
124. Henze pp.137-8; Sterling (1985) pp.49-50.
125. Apple Jnr p. A6; Dobbs, ‘Child of a Turkish Slum’ p. A20; Henze p.137. Thomas and Morgan-Witts claim (1983 pp.209-210) that Turkes got Agca involved in such activities while Agca was still in Ankara.
126. Henze pp.137-8; Apple Jnr. p. A6.
127. Henze p.137
128. Mumcu pp.34-42
129. Sterling (1985) pp.48-9. Cf Henze p.146
130. Ahmad p. A4; Apple Jnr p. A6; Howe, ‘Turks in Disagreement’ p. 4; Mumcu pp.40-2; Sterling (1985) p. 49; Henze p. 146. If so, this corresponded to standard MHP practice. See Agaogullari p. 205. However, Caylan claimed at the trial that the gun was wrapped in cloth and thrown out of the window to the car. Unfortunately, Sener himself eluded authorities and fled the country before he could be arrested.
131. Orsan Oymen, cited in Lee and Coogan, p. 21.
132. Henze pp.164-5
133. Mumcu (1984) p. 46
134. Henze pp.201-2. This is quite possible, since it was shortly after Agca announced that he would tell who the real shooter was that he was sprung from prison, which leads one to suspect that he was withholding important information.
135. Ibid.
136. Mumcu (1982 b) pp.57-761. Henze (p.198) tried to transform the significance of this by pointing to Celik’s links to Ugurlu, which supposedly proved he was a Soviet agent!
137. Lee and Coogan p. 21. See Mumcu (1984) pp.45,363, for Catli’s organizational affiliations.
138. Although Henze unconvincingly tries to absolve the MHP and implicate the Soviets in this crime (pp.139-45), most knowledgeable people attribute the killing of Ipekci to the Turkish far right. It is well known in Turkey that Ipekci was a consistent critic of both the MNHP and the religious right MSP of Necmettin Erbakan, as well as all types of political terrorism and smuggling. See, e.g. Mumcu (1984) pp.154-73; idem Mumcu (1982b) pp.51-7. Moreover, the 945 page indictment prepared by the Ankara military court against Turkes and other MHP leaders listed the Ipekci killing as one of the cases they were being prosecuted for. See Marvin Howe p. A8. However, a 1984 Turkish prosecutor’s report suggested that the real motive was not so much political as economic. In that report, it was concluded that Ugurlu had hired Agca to kill Ipekci in order to forestall the latter’s publication of a series on the Turkish mafia. See Ignatius p.26. Much of that report’s analysis seem to me to be problematic, however.
139. Turkes’ hostility toward Greece is clearly manifested in his own words in Dis Politikamiz ve Kibris (Istanbul, Kutlug, 1974), as well as many MHP-linked publications.
140. Apple Jnr p. A6: Dobbs ‘Child of Turkish Slum’, p. A1. There is some controversy over how the Turkish police were tipped off. Henze (p.148) and Sterling (p.48) claim that the tip was anonymous and that the caller never picked up the reward money, which leads the former to suggest that someone purposely tried to make it look like Agca was a rightist. Yet even if this is true, there are other possible explanations. For example, it could be that the informant became fearful and decided not to risk collecting his reward. See Roulette pp.140-1. And others claim that the lottery ticket salesman Ramazan Gundiz notified the police in person, which would explain how Agca later learned who he was and murdered him. See Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) pp.367-7.
141. Henze pp.149-50
142. Ibid p149. MIT informant Hoca Kocyigit also claimed that Gunes had pressured Agca to implicate the MHP in the Ipekci assassination. See Sterling (1985) pp. 77, 239, note 5 (in chapter 6 section). However, the testimony of such informants, especially those with rightist sympathies, is far from conclusive in this context. For more on Kocyigit, see below, note 195.
143. Henze p.150: Sterling (1985) p. 77.
144. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p. 378.
145. Apple Jnr p. A6; Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’ p. A21; Mumcu (1984) p. 44; Henze pp. 151-2 (although he fails to mention their rightist affiliations). Agca had already made an unsuccessful attempt to escape on 5 November 1979 with Attila Serpil, another rightist militant. See Mumcu (1984) p. 44
146. Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’ p. A20.
147. Sterling (1985) p. 51
148. Mumcu (1984) pp.44-5; Lee and Coogan p. 21
149. Dobbs ‘Child of a Turkish slum..’ p. A20. Indeed, Ugurlu actually visited a Bozkurt named Dogan Yildirim at Kartal-Maltepe at the same time Agca was there. See Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’ p. A18.
150. Lee and Coogan p. 21
151. Apple Jnr p.A6
152. Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’ p.A21
153. Henze pp.159-60
154. Sterling (1985) p.92
155. Mumcu (1984) p.45: Henze p.159
156. Mumcu ibid pp.45-6; Henze pp.159-60. Again, Henze fails to note their rightist affiliations.
157. Mumcu (1984) pp.46-7
158. Ibid pp.46-7, 370. Hergun was an official MHP publication.
159. Ibid p46
160. Howe ‘Rightist Web of Intrigue’ p. A8
161. Sterling (1985) pp.44-5, 67.
162. Henze pp.161-3
163. Andronov, Triple Plot pp.29-35
164. Mersan later admitted meeting someone called ‘Metin’ at the Vitosha, but claimed that he learned this was Agca only after the latter’s arrest in Rome. He also denied involvement in the passport scheme. Henze, p.164: Sterling (1985) pp.34-5. Ugurlu also acknowledged paying
     ‘Metin’ $800, but said he did so at the request of Yildirim. See Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’ p. A18.
165. Oymen, cited by Sterling (1985) pp.58-60
166. Ibid pp.34-5, 84, 223-5: Henze p.164
167. See infra.
168. See infra.
169. At first, no one could identify such a person, but in May 1982 Agca claimed that he was the director of Bulgar-Tabac, a state monopoly manufacturing Marlboros under license. See Sterling (1985) p.111. This has not been confirmed.
170. Dobbs, ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’ p. A18. Aivazov and Celenk deny ever meeting Agca, which of course proves nothing.
171. Cf ibid pp.A18-19: Apple Jnr p.A6; Mumcu (1984) passim; Howe ‘Rightist Web of Intrigue ‘pp.A1, A8; Herman and Brodhead pp.53-4; and all pro-communist sources. On the other hand, Ahmad argues (p.A4) that European neo-fascists aided Agca because it would have been to difficult for the MIT-influenced Turkish right in Europe to do so, but he presents no evidence for this.
172. Henze p.11: cf Sterling (1985) p. 231, where she notes that Agca ‘moved from one Grey Wolf safe house to another in Europe’.
173. Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’ p. A18. For more on the Turkish military’s crackdown on the MHP see Agaogullari pp.205-6.
174. Henze p.169
175. Herman and Brodhead p.53; Barbara Hoffman et al pp.71-2. It should be noted that the publisher of the latter work – Pahl-Rugenstein – has strong links to the Soviet-backed Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP), despite its public image as an independent left outfit. See e.g. Mensing pp.124-8.
176. Hoffman et al pp.69-89; Agaogullari pp.199-200; and especially ex MHP member Yurtaslan.
177. Klose p. A10; Tagliabue ‘Militant Views’ p.A6; Howe ‘Rightist Web of Intrigue’ p. A8. Herman and Brodhead p53.
178. Hoffman et al pp.74, 101-4; ‘Graue Wolfe: Jede Mark ist eine Jkugel’ in Spiegel 34:37 (8 September 1980) pp.58-61.
179. The two victims were Idealist Necati Uygur and Turkish journalist Halil Tireli. See Apple jnr p.A6; Mumcu (1984) p.143.
180. Henze p.170.
181. Ibid pp.168-70. Cf Sterling (1985) p.147; Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’ p.A18.
182. Sterling (1985) pp.33-4; Cf Henze p.175; Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St. Peter’s ‘ p.A18.
183. Henze p.177
184. Sterling (1985) pp.33, 54. Cf Henze pp.176-7; Apple Jnr p.A6.
185. Dobbs ‘Agca’s Changing Testimony’ pp.A1, A21.
186. Sterling (1985) pp. 44-5
187. Cited in Mumcu (1982b) p.107, and in English translation, in Sterling (1985) p69.
188. Note that Tanri is the pre-Islamic Turkish sky deity, and that the phrase used by Agca – Tanri Turku Korusun – is a standard pan-Turkish exclamation. See Landau (1981) pp.147, 150.
189. Sterling (1985) pp.69-70; Henze pp.188-9.
190. Mumcu (82b) pp.106-10. However, this latter does not prove it was genuine, for the Turkish authorities are certainly not above accepting bogus evidence – or even manufacturing it – if they thought it would serve their purposes.
191. Cf Herman and Brodhead pp.54-5.
192. See note 35.
193. Martella’s investigative process exhibited considerable biases and in some cases involved the use of improper judicial procedures. For a general critique see Herman and Brodhead pp.112-21. They also rightly emphasize the highly polarised political context within which the Italian judicial system operates. See ibid pp.66-100.
194. Cited by Dobbs, ‘A Communist Plot…..?’ p.C2. Agca’s extraordinary skill at dissimulation has been emphasised by almost every researcher into the papal assassination. The only issue is whether this was a product of psychosis, careful training, a combination of the two, or other factors.
195. Their general argument is that although Agca lied frequently, he mixed truth in with those lies and provided a wealth of details that he could only have learned if the events he described had actually taken place. See e.g. Sterling (1985) pp.147-8 etc. While I agree that Agca cleverly mixed truth with falsehood, I am not at all convinced that the elements regarded as true by ‘Bulgarian connection’ proponents are in fact the ones that are true. Many of them later turned out to be false, and other details that were accurate seemed to have been gleaned by Agca from media accounts and books or provided to him by his secret service ‘coaches’. See Herman and Brodhead pp.102-112.
196. Herman and Brodhead pp.55-105. Even Martella admitted this elsewhere in his report. See Dobbs, ‘A Communist Plot..?’ p.C2.
197. Herman and Brodhead pp.56, 103-8.
198. Ibid p.56. For Agca’s close personal relationship with Celik, see Dobbs ‘From Sofia to St Peter’s’, p.A18; Henze p.198.
199. Cited by Dobbs, ‘Child of Turkish Slum’, p.A21.
200. See Sterling (1985) p.18 citing Italian judge Antonio Abate’s Statement of Motivation. These included the THKO, THKP-C (Peoples’ Liberation Party-Front of Turkey), Emegin Birligi (Association of Labor) and Halkin Kurtulusu (People’s Liberation) on the left; and the ultranationalist Ulkuculer (Idealists associated with the MSP) and religious rightist Akincilar or ‘Raiders’ (affiliated with the MSP) on the right. For more on the THKO and THKP-C, see Landau (1974) pp.41-4; Saminpp. 159-60. For Halkin Kurtulusu see the latter pp.165 and 147. For the Akincilar, see Oehring pp.164-7.
201. Stirling (1985) p.72.
202. See, e.g. Yilmaz Cetiner, El-Fateh (Istanbul, May 1970); Olsen, pp.197-205; Landau (1974)
203. Thus e.g. memberse of the neo-Nazi Wehrsportsgruppe Hoffman received guerrilla warefare training at PLO camps. See. e.g. ‘Germania: Aumenta la Violenza Politica (sopratuttó Neo-Nazista’ Corriere della Sera (8 Augus 1981), p7, citing the official West German Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz report from 1980. This has been played up in the Western press in order to discredit the PLO, as well as by Lebanese Phalangist spokesmen in an effort to divert attention from their own training of European neo-Nazis and neo-fascists. See de Lutiis (ed) 1986, pp235-6.
204. This not so much due to their psychological dissimilarities or even – at least in the case of the fascist MHP and anti-Soviet radical leftists – to their entirely incompatible ideologies, but rather to the historic enmities between some of these groups. Thus, e.g., such enmities would have made it practically impossible for Kurdish separatists and Idealists to train together despite their mutual hostility towards the Turkish regime.
205. See notes 241-3, 248.
206. See the testimony of Girgin, cited by Sterling (1985) p.73. He claims that both Idealists and religious rightists were being trained at a Phalange camp in the Ketai region.
207. See Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) ‘The Involvement of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking’ in US Congress ‘Subcommittee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse’, 1984 p.58; and ‘Prepared Statement of John C. Lawn, Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency’ in US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations (1984) p.7. Henze claims that it was in 1965, without providing any evidence. See his prepared statement in the latter, p.26. Likewise Mumcu,(1981) p.114.
208. ‘Lawn Statement’ (see note 207) p.5
209. Herman and Brodhead pp.225-33. Note, however, that these doubts are supported by the US Customs Service. In response to a congressional questionnaire, that agency stated that it had ‘no hard evidence that the government of Bulgaria has conducted illicit narcotic trafficking’ and concluded that it was ‘doubtful that any concrete, tangible violations exists (sic) at this time’. See US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, p.115. However, I do not believe that the Customs Service is as well equipped with intelligence sources or analysts as the DEA, and there may also be bureaucratic or political factors involved in this assessment.
210. DEA ‘Involvement….’ (see note 207) p.62. Cf also Nathan Adams ‘Prepared Statement’ pp.72-3, in House Committee on Foreign Relations (see note 207); Sterling (1985) pp.94-5. For the confirmation of KINTEX’s role in the drugs-for-guns trade by independent sources, see Newsday Staff (1973-4) pp.50-8; Mumcu (1981) pp.114-118; Calvi and Schmidt (pp 66-7). Curiously, however, Ugurlu and Celenk were not mentioned in the Newsday team’s list of ‘Istanbul patrons’ who were ‘expected, when asked, to supply intelligence information to the Bulgarian secret police’. See Newsday Staff pp.53-4.
211. DEA ‘Involvement…..’ (Note 207) p.60; ‘Lawn Statement’ (note 207) pp.9-10; and ‘Statement of R.M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs’ in ibid pp.16-17.
212. DEA ‘Involvement…’ p.61 (note 207).
213. Ibid
214. Ibid p.58; ‘Lawn Statement’ (see note 207) p 7. Note, however, that the veracity (or even the existence) of the anonymous source they cite is impossible to determine.
215. On this see Landis (1988) pp.41-7; also Epstein pp.12-20.
216. ‘Henze Prepared Statement’ (see note 207) p.25. (Emphasis in the original.)
217. DEA ‘Involvement….’ (see note 207) p.58; Nathan Adams p.88.
218. DEA ‘Involvement….’ (see note 207) p.58; Adams (ibid p.87; ‘Henze Statement’ (note 207) p.30.
219. Adams ibid pp.91-8; ‘Henze statement’ (note 207) pp.26-8.
220. Sterling (1985) p. 96, citing information leaked to her by an anonymous source at a ‘major US intelligence agency’ (ibid p.93). According to said source, Ugurlu started smuggling in Bulgaria in 1969 and ‘was recruited as an agent of the Bulgarian secret service’ in 1974. Later, a committee of anonymous Turkish generals ‘confirmed’ that both Ugurlu and Celenk had been recruited by the DS. (ibid pp.225-6)
221. ‘Prepared Statement of Jack R. Perry, Retired Foreign Service Officer and Former US Ambassador to Bulgaria’ in US Congress, Committee on Labour and Human Resources (see note
     207) p.64. Unlike Adams, Perry has great experience of Bulgarian affairs and is fluent both in Russian and Bulgarian.
222. Ibid. Contra another Bulgaria defector, ‘Colonel X’, who claims that ‘nothing, absolutely nothing, can escape the notice of the [Bulgarian] state security organization.’ See ‘Henze statement’ (note 207) p.30, citing 24 January 1983 issue of Le Quotidian de Paris.
223. ‘Perry Statement’ (note 221) p64.
224. Ibid. Cf his verbal testimony in ibid p.61. Contra Lawn’s testimony (note 207)
225. Thus Adams claims that working for KINTEX was especially appealing to DS officers, since they were allowed to pocket their KINTEX wages in addition to their normal pay. See his ‘Prepared Statement’ in US Congress. Committee on Labor and Human Resources (note 207) p. 72.
226. See Lawn’s testimony in ibid pp.92-3.
227. Henze’s testimony in ibid p.42, citing London Observer.
228. See Sampson p.10.
229. Nathan Adams p.97.
230. ‘Henze Statement’ (see note 207) p.27. Cf Mumcu (1981) pp.114- 116, who also points out that the Bulgarian government formed commercial partnerships with ‘anti-communist’ Turks.
231. As Henze naturally claims. See ‘Plot to Kill the Pope’ p. 55.
232. ‘Lawn Statement’ (note 207) pp.8-9; ‘Statement of Francis M. Mullen Jnr., Administrator, DEA’, US Congress Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources (note 207) p.22; DEA ‘Involvement……’ (note 207) p.60.
233. For Western intelligence involvement in the drug trade see Kurger and McKoy. The recent involvement of CIA-connected Cuban exiles in the smuggling of cocaine into the US for the financial benefit of the Nicaraguan contras is only the latest in a long series of such operations. On this see, e.g., Leslie Cockburn pp.100-4, 152-88.
234. See supra, note 37. For confirmation of this by a neo-conservative investigative journalist, See Epsteinpp.19, 20: ‘this program of surreptitious authorship had disturbing implications. It meant that much of the material in the public record on the history of the spy war that came from first-hand witnesses – i.e. defectors – had been authorised and selected, if not written by an interested party, the CIA.’
235. This is quite convenient for Henze and Adams, since it absolves them of having to prove that the document is genuine, which seems unlikely. Adams tries to blame the document’s unavailability on the current leftist Greek regime – see his testimony in US Congress Sub- Committee on Human Labour and Resources (note 207) pp.98-9 – but in his earlier article he reported that Sverdlov worked for Greek intelligence for eight years after his defection, i.e., from 1971-79. (Nathan Adams pp.87-8). Since the first three of those years corresponded to the brutal right-wing reign of the colonels, which the CIA had indirectly helped to seize power, it is doubtful that such incriminating documents would have been made available to US intelligence, and then subsequently been leaked to the press – if they were genuine. Cf Herman and Brodhead p.239.
236. See the DEA response to a congressional questionnaire in US Congress Subcommittee (note 207) pp. 113-4. The alleged communist subversion of the West with narcotics is a 30-year old propaganda and disinformation theme of the American right. Although there is some evidence indicating that certain communist regimes have participated in the drug trade as middlemen, there is no substantive evidence that supports the theory that this participation was part of a ‘master plan’ to destabilize the West.
237. ‘Lawn Statement’ (note 207) pp.6-7; DEA statement (note 207) p. 58.
238. See his testimony in US Congress Subcommittee (note 207) p.14. CF also note 209, for a stronger expression of doubt regarding the existence of hard reliable data.
239. Ibid pp.84-5 (citing Topuz)
240. Henze
241. Roulettepp.147-8, citing Milliyet (10 February 1981). Cf also Andronov pp.28-9.
242. Sterling (1985) p.102: ‘The state of affairs in [Turkey] between 1977 and 1979 suggested that [Agca] was on the payroll of some covert operational faction in MIT, Turkey’s CIA, divided then into factions using tactics of infiltration and provocation on both extreme right and left.’ This is an extraordinary claim for a rightist like Sterling, even though she tries to deny its significance by arguing that the MIT was divided into rightist and leftist factions (ibid p.47) – a doubtful assertion, if by the ‘left’ she means anything beyond supporting Ecevit’sshaky coalition government – and then insisting that it didn’t really matter whether the MIT faction manipulating Agca was rightist or leftist, since Ugurlu ‘was on the best of terms with both’. Although it is known that Ugurlu had established good relations with the Turkish far right, I have run across nothing to corroborate Sterling’s claim that the ‘Godfather’ had established any relations with MIT leftists, assuming that the latter even existed. When one recalls that the MIT was in part organised by US intelligence after World War II, it must be assumed that its personnel were carefully screened to make sure that they did not have leftist sympathies, It is of course possible that leftists later infiltrated the organization, but I have seen no evidence of this.
243. Cited by Dobbs, ‘From Sofia to St. Peter’s’, p. A18.
244. This is noted by almost everyone. For some interesting charges and excuses, see ‘Turks Assail Allies in Pope’s Shooting’ in New York Times (24 May 1981), p.8; the pair of articles in ibid (16 May 1981) p.5, which deal with West German and Interpoldefences of their actions, and Tagliabue p.A8.
245. See e.g. Sterling (1985) pp.106-7 (Mehmet Sener and Catlin), 33 and 54 (Taskin), 55-7 (Mersan) etc.
246. Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1983) p,457, note 4. Note that Henze omits this significant detail in his account of Grillmayer’s arrest. See Plot to Kill the Pope pp.175-6.
247. Mumcu (1984) pp.143-5 etc. Cf Howe, ‘Rightist Web of Intrigue’ p.A8; Tagliabue p.A8.
248. Deger (1977) pp.109-115, (1978), passim; Roth and Taylan pp.90-4,116-20, 130-7. Mehmet Ali Birand also notes that the KG organization was made of of ‘patriotic citizens’, i.e. Idealists and other rightists. See 12 Eyul, Saat 04.00 (n.p. Karacan, 1984) pp.88-91. According to Dogan Ozgudeb, the Kontr-Gerilla organization provided facilities for Bozkurt tterrorists being sought by the Turkish authorities after the proclamation of martial law in 1979. See Ozguden p.38. The latter author is a former editor of the extreme left Turkish weekly Ant. See Landau (1974) pp.65,70-2.
249. Mumcu (1980) pp.28-30; idem 1984 pp.145-7, 195-7, 368; idem (1982b) pp.24-31; Herman and Brodhead pp.63-4. This is also stressed by communist authors including Andronov pp.34-41, Kovalyov and Sedykh p.10.
250. ‘Lawn Statement’ (see note 207) p.5. Cf also Henze’s testimony in ibid p.42. Note that this is not the same thing as asserting Bulgaria orchestrates and fully controls this trafficking, which does not generally seem to be the case. For example, Lawn has admitted that not all of the illicit drugs transmitting Bulgaria go through KINTEX (ibid p.93), which implies that some go through without the Bulgarian government’s knowledge, or at least without its active participation. Cf also the testimony of Perry in ibid p.100. On the other hand, Henze claims (ibid p.119) that many of the narcotics being smuggled through networks operating out of Bulgaria don’t even pass through Bulgaria, which is also quite likely.
251. ‘Palmer Statement’ (note 211) pp.16-17
252. Cf Herman and Brodhead p.60
253. ‘Lawn Statement’ (note 207) p.10. This is of course does not rule out the possibility of an indirect association.
254. The phrase is that of Herman and Brodhead, p.60
255. Cited by Dobbs in ‘Child of Turkish Slum’. See supra note 109.
256. Ibid
257. See e.g. ‘The Heroin Trail and Grey Wolves’ Guns’, Searchlight (UK) November 1980 p 7; Mumcu (1980) pp.128-30.

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